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I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. counterterrorism operations today are being carried out on an
unprecedented scale. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, a key element of
these counterterrorism operations has been the detention of suspected terrorists.
As of mid-2012, the United States held 168 terrorism suspects at GuantAnamo
Bay, Cuba,' and roughly three thousand in Afghanistan.2 Even after
transferring most of the Afghan detainees to Afghan control in September
2012, the United States arranged to "maintain control over dozens of foreign
detainees in Afghanistan for the indefinite future." 3 The docket of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit continues to be filled with cases
filed by detainees challenging detentions that, in some cases, are entering a
second decade.4 Meanwhile, Congress and the President have repeatedly
sparred over detention-related issues, including the scope of military
commissions set up to try law-of-war detainees, the transfer of detainees held
abroad to prisons within the United States, the propriety of prosecuting
terrorism suspects in U.S. federal courts, and the unlimited detention of
terrorism suspects without trial.5 Yet the sources of the U.S. government's
authority to detain suspected terrorists, and the limitations on that authority,
remain ill-defined.
This Article aims to fill this gap by clarifying the reach and limits of
existing sources of U.S. government authority to detain suspected terrorists in
1. Charlie Savage, Guantdnamo Prisoner Is Repatriated to Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/world/africa/convicted-al-qaeda-member-is-transferred-from
-guantanamo-to-sudan.html.
2. Mark Hosenball, Recidivism Rises Among Released Guantanamo Detainees, REUTERS,
Mar. 5, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/06/us-usa-guantanamo-recidivism-idUSTRE8250
1120120306. The United States agreed to transfer "nearly all of the more than 3,000 inmates" at the
Parwan detention facility next to Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan to Afghan control over the course of
six months. Ernesto Londoflo & Peter Finn, U.S. Agrees To Transfer Control of Detainees in
Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-agrees-to
-afghan-detention.-system-handover/2012/03/09/gIQATFg50R-story.html; Memorandum of Understanding
Between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America on Transfer of U.S.
Detention Facilities in Afghan Territory to Afghanistan, U.S.-Afg., Mar. 9, 2012, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFF. (Afg.), http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/7671. As of October 2012, the U.S. continued to hold "about 50
non-Afghans at Bagram air base." Charlie Savage, Judge Denies Hearing Request from 3 Afghanistan
Detainees, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/20/us/judge-denies-hearing
-request-from-3-afghanistan-detainees.html.
3. Charlie Savage & Graham Bowley, U.S. To Retain Role as a Jailer in Afghanistan, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/world/asia/us-will-hold-part-of-afghan-prison
-after-handover.html.
4. See, e.g., El-Mashad v. Obama, No. 10-5232, 2012 WL 3797600 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 10,
2012); Chaman v. Obama, No. 10-5130, 10-5203, 10-5131, 10-5183, 10-5182, 2012 WL 3797596 (D.C.
Cir. filed Aug. 10, 2012); Obaydullah v. Obama, 688 F.3d 784 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Alsabri v. Obama, 684
F.3d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Suleiman v. Obama, 670 F.3d 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
5. The President and Congress sparred over a variety of detention-related issues in the
debates over the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong.
(2011) [hereinafter 2012 NDAA], and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013,
H.R. 4310, 112th Cong. (2012) [hereinafter 2013 NDAA]. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Congressional
Negotiators Drop Ban on Indefinite Detention of Citizens, Aides Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2 0 12/1 2 /19 /us/politics/congressional-committee-is-said-to-dmp-ban-on-indefmite
-detention-of-citizens.html; Charlie Savage, Obama Drops Veto Threat over Military Authorization Bill
After Revisions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/us/politics/obama
-wont-veto-military-authorization-bill.html.
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the ongoing conflict with al-Qaeda and associated forces. While prior
scholarship has examined pieces of the detention picture,6 this Article seeks to
offer a more comprehensive view-examining both statutory and constitutional
authority for law-of-war detention, and comparing it to detention and
prosecution of terrorism suspects under domestic criminal law. In the process,
the Article shows that law-of-war detention has weaknesses not often
recognized by those who champion its use for terrorism suspects. In many
cases, criminal law detention and prosecution of terrorism suspects is not only
more consistent with U.S. legal principles and commitments, but is also likely
to be more effective in battling terrorism.
Our inquiry begins with the key statutory authority for counterterrorism
detention: the Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001 (2001 AUMF).
The 2001 AUMF authorizes the President to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.7 Although detention power is not specifically
mentioned in the 2001 AUMF, courts have repeatedly held that the statute
authorizes the detention of members of al-Qaeda and associated forces for the
duration of hostilities as a fundamental incident of waging war. Outside of
these parameters, however, the scope of detention authority under the 2001
AUMF has been less clear.
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (2012 NDAA) 9 codifies
the expansive interpretation of detention authority under the 2001 AUMF
advanced by the Obama Administration since 2009.10 It provides that, pursuant
6. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, Robert M. Chesney & Larkin Reynolds, The Emerging Law of
Detention 2.0: The Guantdnamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking, BROOKINGS INST. & HARv. LAW SCH.
NAT'L SEC. RESEARCH COMM. (Apr. 2012), http://www.brookings.edul-/media/research/files/reports
/2011/5/guantanamo%20wittes/05_guantanamo wittes.pdf; Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held?
Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REv. 769, 845 (2011); Robert Chesney & Jack
Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1079 (2008); Chris Jenks & Eric Talbot Jensen, Indefinite Detention Under the Laws of War, 22
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 41 (2011); David Mortlock, Definite Detention: The Scope of the President's
Authority to Detain Enemy Combatants, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 375 (2010); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth,
The President's Power To Detain "Enemy Combatants": Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison's
Forgotten War, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1567 (2004).
7. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
[hereinafter 2001 AUMF].
8. See cases cited infra Subsection II.A.1.
9. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5. The included terrorism detention provisions were among the
most controversial aspects of the defense budget discussion. The 2013 NDAA was signed into law
shortly before this Article went to press. Despite calls to restrict the President's authority to detain
terrorism suspects during the debate over the new Authorization Act, the version that was signed into
law left the President's detention authority effectively intact. 2013 NDAA, supra note 5.
10. The government has maintained that authority under the 2001 AUMF extends to
"associated forces," as well as those directly involved in planning, authorizing, committing, or aiding the
attacks. Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative to
Detainees Held at Guantinamo Bay at 2, In re GuantAnamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 624 F. Supp. 2d 27
(D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) (Nos. 05-0763, 05-1646, 05-2378) [hereinafter Memorandum Regarding the
Government's Detention Authority].
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to the 2001 AUMF, the President has authority to detain "covered persons,"
including those who "planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for
those attacks" and those who were "a part of or substantially supported al-
Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners." Although the 2012 NDAA
explicitly disclaims any intention either to limit or to expand the scope of the
2001 AUMF,12 it reaches beyond the text of the original authorization to
provide legislative support for law-of-war detention of members of associated
forces that, although not directly involved in the September 11 attacks, may
pose threats to the United States currently or in the future. By affirming an
expansive reading of detention authority under the 2001 AUMF, and by
providing for temporary military custody of certain specified terrorism
suspects,' 3 the 2012 NDAA significantly expands the possible scope of law-of-
war detention.14
This Article first examines the reach-and limits of existing statutory and
constitutional authority for the detention of terrorism suspects. Part II begins by
discussing the scope of the government's detention authority under the 2001
AUMF. It then explores the extent and limitations of alternative sources of law-
of-war detention authority-that is, sources of authority to detain in the course
of military operations. 15 It examines not only the power to detain terrorism
suspects granted to the President in the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (2002 AUMF)1 and the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA)", but also the President's independent
power to detain under Article II of the Constitution. It concludes that, while
each of these legal authorities offers limited additional detention authority,
none of them offers a basis for authority that could be used to justify any
11. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1021(b). For further discussion of "associated forces," see
infra Subsection II.A.I.c.
12. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1021(d) ("Nothing in this section is intended to limit or
expand the authority of the President or the scope of the Authorization for Use of Military Force."). In
his signing statement, President Obama also asserted that Section 1021 "breaks no new ground and is
unnecessary." Press Release, The White House Office of Press Secretary, Statement by the President on
H.R. 1540 (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/3 I/statement-president
-hr-1540.
13. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1022 (requiring military custody "pending disposition under
the law of war" for a person who is "captured in the course of hostilities" authorized by the 2001
AUMF, who is "a member of, or part of, al-Qaeda or an associated force that acts in coordination with
or pursuant to the direction of al-Qaeda," and who has "participated in the course of planning or carrying
out an attack or attempted attack against the United States or its coalition partners").
14. Section 1021 of the NDAA is currently being challenged by a group of writers and
political activists on First Amendment grounds in the Southern District of New York. The court granted
the plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction on September 12, 2012. Hedges v. Obama, No. 12-
CIV-331 (ITBF), 2012 WL 3999839 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012).
15. This Article uses "law-of-war detention" interchangeably with "military detention."
16. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
243, 116 Stat. 1498 [hereinafter 2002 AUMF].
17. Similar to the Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948 (2009)) [hereinafter 2009 MCA].
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significant number of terrorism detentions not already authorized under the
2001 AUMF.
Part III examines the affirmative limitations on law-of-war detention
imposed by international law. Under jus ad bellum, the use of military force,
including detention, is only authorized where the host state has consented to,
the Security Council has authorized, or self-defense has necessitated the use of
military force. Under jus in bello, privileged combatants may be held only until
the end of hostilities. Unprivileged enemy combatants may be tried for crimes
committed in the course of their belligerency and detained punitively past the
end of hostilities. But if they are not charged with a crime or tried, they also
must be released at the end of hostilities. Finally, international human rights
law imposes additional limitations on the use of law-of-war detention authority.
The United States has ratified a series of human rights treaties that create
obligations that bear on the legality of initial and continued detention.
Part IV discusses criminal detention as a frequently preferable alternative
to law-of-war detention in the terrorism context. The 2012 NDAA
demonstrates strong congressional support for the use of law-of-war detention
for terrorism suspects. This Article challenges this policy trend and highlights
criminal detention as a worthy alternative. Part IV shows that while law-of-war
detention is appropriate in some contexts, it has many drawbacks, including
lack of certainty about conviction and sentence duration, heightened risk of
error, poor incentives for cooperation by defendants and allies, and
inflexibility. By contrast, the use of criminal detention and prosecution has a
number of advantages that produce greater predictability, legitimacy, and
flexibility. Even so, the government has consistently pointed to certain
situations in which it believes detention and prosecution within the criminal
justice system to be impossible. In these cases, alternative authority to detain
may exist under the authorities described in Part II.
Part V concludes that, where criminal antiterrorism statutes provide
authority to prosecute and detain, this authority should be treated as the first
resort-including in situations that have previously relied on military
commissions and law-of-war detention. There are challenges inherent in the
increased use of the criminal system in the terrorism context, but these
challenges can be overcome in most cases. Indeed, some of the challenges
posed by criminal law can be seen as advantages of criminal prosecution and
detention as opposed to law-of-war detention. Thus, in most cases, suspected
terrorists can-and should-be charged and prosecuted within the federal
criminal justice system.
18. For example, the government opined on the question of detention authority after acquittal
in a brief in the trial by military commission of Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Muhammed Al Nashiri. Gov't
Response to Defense Motion for Appropriate Relief To Determine if the Trial of This Case Is One from
Which the Defendant May Be Meaningfully Acquitted, United States v. Al Nashiri (Oct. 27, 2011), at 6,
available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Govt-Response-to-Al-Nashiri
-Motion.pdf ("Should the accused be acquitted following a trial by military commission, the government
could, as a legal matter, continue to detain the accused during hostilities pursuant to the AUMF if it
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused was part of or substantially supported al
Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces.").
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II. LAW-OF-WAR DETENTION AUTHORITY AND LIMITATIONS
Under U.S. law, the President must trace his authority to detain
individuals in the context of military operations to one of two sources of legal
authority: either a specific statute granting him that authority or his independent
constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the
United States. Both sources of authority are, however, narrowly circumscribed,
while international law-including the law of armed conflict and human rights
law-provides independent restrictions on the scope and nature of military
detention authority.
The President's statutory authority to detain individuals in the course of
military operations is provided in three separate statutes. First, the 2001 AUMF
provides congressionally authorized detention authority in the context of
hostilities that have a nexus to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United
States. Second, the 2002 AUMF provides detention authority in the context of
the conflict in Iraq. Third, the MCA provides independent statutory authority to
detain those whom it grants jurisdiction to prosecute. All of these sources of
authority, however, have well-defined limits that constrain the President's
authority to detain those whom he suspects of engaging in terrorist activities.
The President also possesses independent constitutional authority to
detain individuals in the course of military operations. This authority derives
from the President's power as Commander-in-Chief and his responsibility to
protect the nation in times of emergency. This authority is also highly
constrained. There is consensus that the President has independent Article II
authority to conduct defensive military operations in very limited settings.19
When he acts on his own constitutional authority, however, any use of force
must be closely tied to and justified by permitted limited purposes. Therefore,
once again, the detention authority of the President is limited.
This Part considers each source of authority for law-of-war detention of
terrorism suspects. Prior scholarship has examined these sources of authority
individually, but so far none has addressed them as a whole. 20 Here, we offer a
comprehensive overview of the President's current law-of-war detention
authority. Examining all of the statutory and constitutional sources of detention
authority together makes clear that the detention power is far from unlimited.
Indeed, even the most significant grant of authority-that found in the 2001
AUMF-is carefully circumscribed. Understanding the true reach of and limits
to the power to detain is an essential first step toward deciding the best course
forward for addressing the threat of terrorism.
19. See infra notes 167-170.
20. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARv. L. REv. 689 (2008);
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terror, 118
HARv. L. REv. 2047 (2005); Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in Chief 81 IND. L.J. 1169
(2006). For more examples of the existing literature, see supra note 6.
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A. Statutory Authority
1. The 2001 AUMF
A week after terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon
killed nearly three thousand people,2 1 Congress passed the 2001. AUMF,
authorizing the President to respond to the attacks. The statute authorized the
President:
[T]o use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations
or persons.22
Although the statute does not explicitly refer to detention, all three
branches of government have since affirmed that the statute authorizes
detention. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the
statute incorporated detention authority for the duration of the war against al-
Qaeda,23 because the "capture and detention of lawful combatants and the
capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement
and practice,' are 'important incident[s] of war."' 24 The plurality arrived at its
conclusion that detention authority was inherent in the statutory authorization
to use military force by examining international law, including the customary
concept of belligerent rights.25 Belligerent rights grant sovereigns affirmative
capabilities in wartime, including capture, detention,2 6 and the seizure of
neutral ships. 27 The plurality thus used longstanding international legal
principles to give content to non-specific statutory language by inferring an
authority generally associated with hostilities. 28 Under international law,
21. United Airlines Flight 93, which also was hijacked by terrorists on September 11 and was
reportedly headed for the U.S. Capitol, crash-landed in Pennsylvania when the passengers fought to
regain control of the plane. All those on board died.
22. 2001 AUMF, supra note 7, § 2(a).
23. For more on the duration-based limitations on law-of-war detention authority, see infra
Section III.B.
24. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quoting Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28, 30 (1942)).
25. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion); see also Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.)
164, 190 (1853) (finding a belligerent right to form a civil government over a conquered territory); Bas
v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800) (holding that in war fought "under a general authority, . .. all the
rights ... of war attach").
26. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519, 521 (plurality opinion).
27. See, e.g., Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 43-44.
28. If the 2001 AUMF can be read expansively as authorizing the President to "do what the
laws of war permit," Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 2091, then other aspects of belligerent
rights-including, for example, the right to detain members of enemy forces who have not yet engaged
in combat-might also be inferred under the same logic employed in Hamdi. The Obama
Administration suggested this possibility in its In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation
memorandum. Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 5-6
(citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38; Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 320 (D.D.C. 2005), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)); id. at 6 (citing Geneva Convention (III)
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 art. 4, opened for signature Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]).
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detention authority is predicated on the importance of preventing a combatant's
return to the battlefield. In light of this longstanding principle, a plurality of the
Court concluded that the authority to detain until the end of hostilities was "an
exercise of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has authorized the
President to use." 29
The Supreme Court's holding affirmed the consistent legal position of the
U.S. government-one that has held across administrations. In 2009, for
example, the Obama Administration filed a memorandum with the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit discussing its authority to detain those held at
the U.S. military base in Guantinamo Bay. It argued that it possessed detention
authority by virtue of the 2001 AUMF.3 0 In 2012, Congress endorsed this
understanding of the authority granted in the 2001 AUMF for the purposes of
detention. In a section of 2012 NDAA entitled "Affirmation of Authority of the
Armed Forces of the United States to Detain Covered Persons Pursuant to the
Authorization for Use of Military Force," Congress stated that "the authority of
the President to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the
Authorization for Use of Military Force ... includes the authority for the
Armed Forces of the United States to detain covered persons." 31
It is well established that the 2001 AUMF authorizes detention, but the
scope of that authority is much less clear. In this section, we therefore examine
the specific scope of detention authority under the 2001 AUMF. The power to
detain under the AUMF rests on several factors in the statute. First, detention
authority under the language of the 2001 AUMF requires a sufficient link
between a targeted nation, organization, or person and the September 11
attacks. Second, the geographic scope of the AUMF is not expressly restricted;
the AUMF apparently authorizes the use of force wherever those sufficiently
linked to the September 11 attacks may be found. Finally, the statutory
authority to hold a detainee under the 2001 AUMF may derive either from the
individual's own role in planning, authorizing, committing, or aiding the
September 11 attacks, or from his or her association with an organization that
performed such a role.
a. September 11 Nexus Requirement
The central textual restriction on the scope of detention authority under
the 2001 AUMF is the September 11 nexus requirement. Under the terms of the
statute, the President is authorized to use military force "against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
29. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion).
30. Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 10, at I ("The
detention authority conferred by the AUMF is necessarily informed by principles of the laws of war."
(citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion))).
31. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1021(a) ("Congress affirms that the authority of the President
to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(Public Law 107-40) includes the authority for the Armed Forces of the United States to detain covered
persons (as defined in subsection (b)) pending disposition under the law of war."). Interestingly-and
importantly-the language in this section of the statute is limited to detention and does not extend to
targeting.
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aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States."32 Given that the September
11 attacks occurred over a decade ago, the need to establish a link to those
attacks arguably provides some substantive limits on an otherwise broad grant
of military authority. 33 This is especially true in the context of counterterrorism
efforts involving groups with potentially fluid organizational structures and
membership. The statute does grant the President authority to determine which
nations, organizations, or persons satisfy the criteria.34 Nonetheless, this does
not give the President authority to interpret the scope of the statute to reach
individuals or groups outside the scope of the authority granted.
The nexus with September 11 is necessary to the President's authority to
act under the statute. A holding by a district court interpreting the statute to
require a nexus either with the September 11 attacks or with a terrorist threat
was subsequently overturned, although on other grounds.35 Moreover, an
earlier version of the authorization, proposed by the White House, that granted
broad authority "to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or
aggression against the United States,"36 was dismissed as an "overreach." 37 It
would be perverse, therefore, to read the narrower language adopted by
Congress to encompass the broader authority that it specifically declined to
enact. The statutory detention authority under the 2001 AUMF thus reaches
only so far as a sufficient link can be established between the September 11
attacks and the organization or individual concerned.
The counterterrorism provisions of the 2012 NDAA provide additional
congressional guidance about the meaning of the nexus requirement. The text
of the Act asserts that it neither limits nor expands the scope of the 2001
38AUMF. Yet it serves to codify the Administration's expansive interpretation
of the federal government's detention authority under the statute. Since 2009,
the Administration has argued that it possesses authority to detain "persons
32. 2001 AUMF, supra note 7, § 2(a).
33. Former legal adviser John Bellinger Ill called in November 2010 for new detention
authority on the grounds that the 2001 AUMF "provides insufficient authority for our military and
intelligence personnel to conduct counterterrorism operations today and inadequate protections for those
targeted or detained, including U.S. citizens." John B. Bellinger III, Op-Ed., A Counterterrorism Law in
Need of Updating, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2010/11/25/AR2010112503116.html.
34. 2001 AUMF, supra note 7, § 2(a).
35. In Khalid v. Bush, the D.C. District Court concluded that Congress "in effect, gave the
President the power to capture and detain those who the military determined were either responsible for
the September 11th attacks or posed a threat of future terrorist attacks." 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 319
(D.D.C. 2005) (emphasis added), decision vacated sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C.
Cir. 2007), order vacated, 511 U.S. 1160 (2007). According to the statute, the 2001 AUMF was created
"in order to prevent any future acts of terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations,
or persons." 2001 AUMF, supra note 7, § 2(a).
36. David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and Political
Considerations in Authorizing Use ofForce Against International Terrorism, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71, 73
(2002) (quoting Draft Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force (on file with the Harvard
International Law Journal)).
37. Id. at 74.
38. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1021(d).
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who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or
has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces."39
According to this reading, a person may be detained if he has at some time in
the past supported Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated forces that are
currently engaged in hostilities against the United States. The 2012 NDAA
adopts nearly identical language. It describes two classes of "covered
persons." 4 0 The first, "[a] person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2011, or harbored those
responsible for those attacks,"4 1 echoes the language in the 2001 AUMF
requiring a nexus with the September 11 attacks. The second, "[a] person who
was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has
directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces," 42 affirms the
Administration's litigation position nearly verbatim-for detention purposes-
and thus substantially weakens the September 11 nexus requirement for the
purposes of detention. 4 3
b. Geographic Reach
The 2001 AUMF does not include any explicit geographical restriction."
The lack of such restrictive language in the statute, coupled with language in
the preamble invoking the rights of the United States "to self-defense and to
protect United States citizens both at home and abroad," implies that the
AUMF authorizes the use of force-as a matter of domestic law-wherever
those sufficiently linked to the September 11 attacks may be found.4 5
The Fourth Circuit accepted this geographically open reading of the 2001
AUMF in Padilla v. Hanft.46 The court rejected the argument that the 2001
AUMF did not authorize detention of a terrorist suspect seized on American
soil, noting that the language in Hamdi articulating the authority to detain as a
fundamental incident of war makes no distinction between the lawfulness of
capturing and detaining a terrorist suspect abroad as opposed to in the United
39. Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 2
(emphasis added).
40. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1021(b).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. For a discussion of associated forces, see infra Subsection II.A.l.c. Note again that the
relevant provision for the 2012 NDAA does not apply to targeting. The nexus requirement would appear
to remain intact, therefore, for targeting purposes. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1021 (entitled
"Affirmation of Authority of the Armed Forces of the United States to Detain Covered Persons Pursuant
to the Authorization for Use of Military Force" (emphasis added)).
44. This is in contrast with, for example, the subsequent 2002 AUMF, supra note 16, which
specifically limits authority to operations in Iraq.
45. 2001 AUMF, supra note 7, pmbl.
46. 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006).
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47States. The Padilla court reasoned that if detention authority is predicated on
the necessity of preventing a combatant from returning to the battlefield,4 8 then
the location of capture should not be determinative. 4 9 The District Court for the
District of South Carolina reached the same conclusion in a separate case,
reasoning that, because the 2001 AUMF was enacted in direct response to the
September 11 attacks, Congress must have intended its scope to reach alien al-
Qaeda operatives who had already entered the country and were plotting
terrorist attacks.50 The District Court for the District of Columbia similarly
concluded that "the AUMF does not place geographic parameters on the
President's authority to wage this war against terrorists," explaining that any
interpretation that limited search, capture, and detention to the battlefields of
Afghanistan would contradict Congress's clear intention to the contrary and
unduly hinder the President's ability to protect the country from future terrorist
acts and to gather vital intelligence. 5 1
Although the locus of capture does not place an absolute geographic
limitation on the authority to detain under the 2001 AUMF, geography still
may be relevant to the scope of the statutory authorization. Specifically,
geography may be a significant indicator of both whether a given organization
falls within the substantive scope of the 2001 AUMF and whether a specific
individual has sufficient ties to a relevant organization to be subject to
detention authority. 52
International law also places affirmative limits on the geographic scope of
the President's lawful detention authority. Even if the 2001 AUMF grants
authority as a matter of U.S. domestic law to engage in military action-
including detention of combatants-that authority is subject to independent
international legal limits. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states that
"[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."53 Moreover, state sovereignty places limits on the authority of the
United States to engage in acts short of armed attack-including seizing and
detaining individuals-on the territory of another country. 54 The only
47. Id. at 393-94.
48. Id. at 391.
49. Id. at 393-94.
50. Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 680 (D.S.C. 2005).
51. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 320 (D.D.C. 2005), decision vacated sub nom.
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir 2007), order vacated, 511 U.S. 1160 (2007); see also
Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV.
769, 845 (2011) (discussing the implicit rejection of geographic constraints on detention authority by the
D.C. Circuit in Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
52. Chesney, supra note 51, at 847 (raising the question of whether a provision of support
criterion for membership in a designated organization, if legitimate, must be limited to persons captured
or acting in certain geographic locations, or to certain types of support, or to support rendered with
certain specific mental states).
53. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
54. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 195 (June 27); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 1 64 (Nov. 6); Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 146 (Dec. 19).
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exceptions are where the governing state authority has granted its consent,55 the
Security Council has authorized action, or unilateral state action is justified as
a matter of self-defense.57
c. Included Organizations and Associated Forces
The authority to hold a detainee under the 2001 AUMF may derive either
from the individual's own role in planning, authorizing, committing, or aiding
the September 11 attacks, or from his or her association with an organization
that performed such a role.58 The question of which organizations trigger 2001
AUMF detention authority for their members has been a matter of controversy,
but the U.S. government and some academics have suggested that co-
belligerency theory can provide some guidance. 5 9 Some support for this
approach is now found in the 2012 NDAA, which includes in its definition of
"covered persons,"
a person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners, including any such person who has committed a belligerent
act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.60
The language of the 2001 AUMF explicitly refers to organizations that
the President determines directly "planned, authorized, committed, or aided"
the September 11 attacks "or harbored such organizations," thereby clearly
encompassing members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 6  However, it is the
government's position, now endorsed by Congress, that the statute also
provides for detention authority for "persons who were part of. . . associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners." 62 The D.C. District Court has also agreed that the "President also has
the authority to detain persons who were part of Taliban or al-Qaida forces or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
55. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 327 (1963);
Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE 63 (2d ed. 1991).
56. U.N. Charter arts. 39-51.
57. Id.art.51.
58. Id.
59. E.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 2112; Memorandum Regarding the
Government's Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 7.
60. 2012 NDAA, supra note 9, § 102 1(b).
61. 2001 AUMF, supra note 7; Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention
Authority, supra note 10, at 6 ("[Ilt is enough that an individual was part of al-Qaida or Taliban forces,
the principal organizations that fall within the AUMF's authorization of force.").
62. Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 2; see
also Anam v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D.D.C. 2009) ("[P]ersons who were part of... associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities. . . ."); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70 (D.D.C. 2009)
("Because the AUMF permits the President 'to use all necessary and appropriate force' against
'organizations' involved in the September II attacks, it naturally follows that force is also authorized
against the members of [associated] organizations.").
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coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act in
aid of such enemy armed forces." 63
The extension of authority to "associated forces" includes several
ambiguities. As noted earlier, covered persons under the 2012 NDAA include
"[a] person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban,
or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities."6 The change in tense
raises questions as to whether members of groups created after September 11,
2001, are included in the detention authorization. If they are, then the Act
would provide for a significant expansion of detention authority beyond that
65authorized in the 2001 AUMF-an expansion that the act itself denies.
In Hamlily v. Obama, a case that continues to spark debate, the D.C.
District Court interpreted the term "associated forces" to mean "'co-
belligerents' as that term is understood under the law of war."66 The concept of
co-belligerency remains "undertheorized," 67 but captures the notion of actively
waging .war in concert with another belligerent. The Hamlily court used the
concept of neutrality to inform its analysis of co-belligerency, although the
concepts are legally distinct. Under the Hamlily analysis, a group "attains co-
belligerent status by violating the law of neutrality-i.e., the duty of non-
participation and impartiality." 69 Violations of neutrality include recruiting
agents, conveying weapons, or facilitating communications for a belligerent
party. 70 The Court did not make clear what level of neutrality violation it
required for a group to be considered a co-belligerent.71 However, it did clarify
63. Anam, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 64. The opinion goes on to note that "this precise framework has
been adopted by multiple Merits Judges, and is not inconsistent with Judge Walton's opinion in Gherebi
v. Obama, as applied." Id. (internal citation omitted).
64. 2012 NDAA, supra note 9, § 1021(b) (emphasis added).
65. Id. § 1021(d) ("Nothing in this section is intended to limit or expand the authority of the
President or the scope of the Authorization for Use of Military Force.").
66. Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 70, 74. The regularly cited example of the United States' past
practice in targeting co-belligerents against whom it did not originally declare war is Vichy France.
Having declared war against Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, the United States
targeted French forces in North Africa after the Vichy government formed an alliance with Germany
and fought against the United Kingdom. See Mortlock, supra note 6, at 395 n. 131.
67. Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conflict with al-Qaeda,
47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 75, 90 (2011).
68. Id. at 87 ("[W]hen neutral states take actions that are seen as .. . violating
neutrality ... [s]uch violations do not necessarily bring neutrality to an end ... or necessitate that the
violator has become the 'enemy' of either belligerent.").
69. Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75. Note that the traditional notion of co-belligerency is not
automatically implicated by individual violations of neutrality. As a leading treatise on the international
law of the nineteenth century-when neutrality and co-belligerency law were developed-explains,
"[m]ere violation of neutrality must not be confused with the ending of neutrality,. . . [T]he condition of
neutrality continues to exist between a neutral and a belligerent in spite of a violation of neutrality." 2 L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 358 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952). In fact, "[t]he law of
neutrality itself did not traditionally articulate when a state or individual gave up its neutral status and
became a belligerent." Ingber, supra note 67, at 88.
70. Hague V Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in
Case of War on Land arts. 2-5, 9, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1, Bevans 654.
71. Neutrality is at least ended by "acts of force performed for the purpose of attacking a
belligerent. They are acts of war, and they create a condition of war between such neutral and the
belligerent concerned." OPPENHEIM, supra note 69, § 320. Others have argued that "[a] state that
significantly and systematically violates its neutral duties-through participation in the conflict or
flagrant violations of impartiality-may be treated as a co-belligerent." Tess Bridgeman, Note, The Law
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that associated forces "do not include terrorist organizations who merely share
an abstract philosophy or even a common purpose with al Qaeda-there must
be an actual association in the current conflict with al Qaeda or the Taliban." 72
To qualify as a co-belligerent, the group must be a "'fully fledged belligerent
fighting in association with one or more belligerent powers.' 73
The application of traditional law-of-war principles such as co-
belligerency and neutrality to the evaluation of the 2001 AUMF's scope is
generally regarded as consistent with the Administration's general position that
"[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war rules governing international armed
conflicts ... must inform the interpretation of the detention authority," 74 and
with its more specific position that "the United States has authority to detain
individuals who, in analogous circumstances in a traditional armed conflict
between the armed forces of opposing governments, would be detainable under
principles of co-belligerency." 75 However, certain aspects of neutrality law-
for instance, requirements relating to states' use of their territory--do not
translate perfectly into the context of the United States' conflict with
decentralized terrorist groups. Several scholars have, indeed, been highly
critical of applying the theory of co-belligerency from international law to
interpret statutory authority.76 Although the 2012 NDAA codifies the
Administration's inclusion of associated forces within the scope of detention
authority under the 2001 AUMF, the imperfect application of neutrality law to
non-state actors may present difficulties with the use of traditional concepts of
co-belligerency and neutrality to identify the specific organizations that fall
within the reach of this authority.
d. Level ofIndividual Affiliation
Closely linked to the identification of organizations falling within the
scope of the 2001 AUMF is the identification of individuals sufficiently
affiliated with such organizations to be subject to detention under the statute.
The government's position, endorsed by Congress in the 2012 NDAA, is that
the United States may lawfully detain persons who were either "part of' or
ofNeutrality and the Conflict with Al Qaeda, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186, 1200 (2010). In addition, "[p]rior
U.S. practice is consistent with the conclusion that a country becomes a co-belligerent when it permits
U.S. armed forces to use its territory for purposes of conducting military operations." Memorandum
from the Office of Legal Counsel, "Protected Person" Status in Occupied Iraq Under the Fourth Geneva
Convention 8 (Mar. 18, 2004), http://justice.gov/olc/20040gc4marl8.pdf.
72. Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 74 n.17.
73. Id. at 75 (quoting Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 2112).
74. Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 1. The
Administration applies this framework to detention power, arguing that "[t]he president also has the
authority under the AUMF to detain in this armed conflict those persons whose relationship to al-Qaida
or the Taliban would, in appropriately analogous circumstances in a traditional international armed
conflict, render them detainable." Id.
75. Id. at 7.
76. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 67. Indeed, there are reasons to question whether neutrality
law and co-belligerency theory have any applicability to transnational non-international armed conflict
in a post-U.N. Charter era. Neutrality theory, after all, was developed in and is premised upon a world in
which war is a legitimate means of resolving disputes between states. See Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J.
Shapiro, The Law of the World (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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"substantially supported" al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, 7  but
there is some ambiguity regarding which specific activities constitute sufficient
evidence of membership or support. As a threshold matter, the Supreme Court
determined that detention authority under the 2001 AUMF extended to U.S.
citizens. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the plurality found that a citizen, no less than an
alien, could be engaged in armed conflict against the United States, and
therefore could be held as an enemy combatant.78
The definition of individual membership is not explicitly addressed in the
2001 AUMF, and evaluating membership is complicated by the informal and
sometimes unstable organizational structures of the groups involved.79 The
individuals most clearly within the scope of detention authority are those who
personally take a direct role in combat against U.S. forces as part of a
qualifying organization, such as al-Qaeda or the Taliban.8 0 The D.C. District
Court has also upheld the President's authority to detain an individual who
directly functions or participates within the military command structure of a
designated organization, even without evidence of his or her direct participation
in combat.81
Although direct participation in combat is sufficient to establish authority
to detain under U.S. law, several courts have held that it is not necessary.82
Substantial gray area exists between an individual who operates within al-
Qaeda's and the Taliban's formal military command structures and a
"freelancer" who is arguably beyond the scope of the authorization.8 ' The
77. Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 3
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also 2012 NDAA, supra note 9, § 1021(b).
78. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion).
79. See Chesney, supra note 51, at 794 (contrasting the concept of membership in targeted
organizations with the clearer concept of membership in structured armed forces, where identification is
facilitated both by uniforms and the likelihood that a captured member will admit his status in order to
obtain the benefit of POW status).
80. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (indicating that detention authority extends at least to persons
bearing arms as part of a Taliban military unit in Afghanistan).
81. Al Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2009) (identifying the 'key
inquiry' as "'whether the individual functions or participates within or under the command structure of
the organization"' (quoting Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (2009))). It is notable that this
holding appears to be in direct tension with the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC)
interpretative guidance on direct participation in hostilities under international humanitarian law (IHL).
See Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Law,
90 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 991, 1108 (2008) ("Individuals who continuously accompany or
support an organized armed group, but whose function does not involve direct participation in hostilities,
are not members of that group within the meaning of IHL. Instead, they remain civilians assuming
support functions .... ).
82. See, e.g., Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that operating
within al-Qaeda's formal command structure is sufficient but not necessary to show that the individual is
part of the organization); Kandari v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 2d 11, 22 (D.D.C. 2010) ("[P]roof that
an individual actually fought for or on behalf of al Qaeda or the Taliban, while sufficient, is also not
required to demonstrate that an individual is 'part of' such enemy forces.").
83. See Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that "'the purely
independent conduct of a freelancer is not enough' to establish that an individual is 'part of' al-Qaida"
and therefore subject to detention under the AUMF (quoting Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725)); see also
Chesney, supra note 51, at 828 (arguing that the D.C. Circuit cases since Boumediene indicate a "strong
consensus that membership counts as a sufficient condition for detention, but reveal considerable
disagreement as to both the actual meaning of membership and whether support independent of
membership can serve as an alternative sufficient condition").
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evaluation of membership is made on a case-by-case basis through judicial
assessment of the "totality of the circumstances." 84 The government has
endorsed this case-by-case approach to evaluating individual membership for
85the purposes of detention.
Significant factors examined by courts evaluating whether an individual's
connection to a designated organization constitutes membership include
attendance at military training facilities associated with targeted groups,
overnight use of affiliated guesthouses, "self-identification with an organization
through verbal or written statements, participation in a group's hierarchy or
command structure" (both military and non-military), and participation in an
organization's activities (both military and non-military). 6  Although courts
look to these common indicators, they diverge with respect to which factor or
constellation of factors constitutes adequate proof of membership. 8 7
The related question of whether the government may detain an individual
on the basis of his or her support of a designated enemy organization-even
when the individual is not a member of the organization-has been a source of
controversy. The Administration has consistently asserted the authority to
detain individuals on the grounds of "substantial" support, and at least one
court has agreed with this position.9 0 However, other court decisions and
84. Chesney, supra note 51, at 845-46 (citing Khan v. Obama, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.
2010)).
85. Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 7 ("In
each case, given the nature of the irregular forces, and the practice of their participants or members to try
to conceal their affiliations, judgments about the detainability of a particular individual will necessarily
turn on the totality of the circumstances.").
86. See, e.g., Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 389-90 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
1062 (2006); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 2010); al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534
F.3d 213, 323 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert.
granted, 129 S. Ct. 680, vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
87. See Chesney, supra note 51, at 866 (summarizing the findings of various courts reaching
the scope of detention authority with regard to the relevance of past conduct, associational status,
citizenship, location of capture, and future dangerousness, among other factors). Compare Gherebi v.
Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 69 (D.D.C. 2009) (implying that membership in the military chain of
command of a covered organization is a necessary condition), with al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8,
16-17 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (implying that membership is a sufficient condition and may be proven by
training camp attendance).
88. Chesney, supra note 51, at 828.
89. The Bush Administration defined enemy combatants as individuals who were "part of or
supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces," including "any person who has committed
a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy forces." Mortlock, supra note 6, at
386. The Obama Administration has confined its articulation of the scope of its detention authority to
those who provided "substantial" support. Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention
Authority, supra note 10, at 7 ("Under a functional analysis, individuals who provide substantial support
to al-Qaida forces in other parts of the world may properly be deemed part of al-Qaida itself."). The
government's memorandum recognized uncertainty regarding the degree of support that would justify
detention. Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 2 ("[T]he
particular facts and circumstances justifying detention will vary from case to case.. .. [T]he contours of
the 'substantial support' and 'associated forces' bases of detention will need to be further developed in
their application to concrete facts in individual cases.").
90. Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 4 (finding that the 2001 AUMF authorizes the President to
detain both persons who are part of enemy organizations and those who provide substantial support to
such organizations); see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding, in
dicta, that the defendant could be detained, not only as a member of a belligerent force allied with the
Taliban, but also for providing support to the group).
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commentary have taken the position that statutory .authority to detain
individuals who are "part of' an organization involved in the September 11
terrorist attacks does not extend to individuals who simply supported enemy
forces, even if such support is "substantial" or "direct." 91 Congress has now
provided its answer to this question. The 2012 NDAA extends detention
authority to persons who were either "part of or substantially supported"
covered organizations, including those who have "directly supported [hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners] in aid of such enemy
forces."92 This language extends beyond individuals who substantially
supported al-Qaeda and the Taliban to include those who have supported
unspecified associated forces.93
Although courts have disagreed on the substantive requirements to meet
membership or support criteria under the 2001 AUMF, they agree that the
government bears the evidentiary burden of proving sufficient affiliation with
an organization or affiliated group, and that a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard is appropriate. 94 Hearsay evidence has been treated as admissible for
the purposes of determining detainability. The Hamdi plurality, for instance,
found that "the exigencies of the circumstances may demand" the tailoring of
enemy-combatant proceedings, aside from the core elements, "to alleviate their
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military
conflict," and specifically stated that hearsay may need to be accepted as the
most reliable available evidence. 95 When addressing hearsay statements, judges
91. Al Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that, while evidence
of support may be probative of whether an individual is part of an enemy organization, it does not by
itself provide grounds for detention); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69, 70, 76 (rejecting both
the concepts of "substantial support" and "directly support[ing] hostilities" as an independent basis for
detention, but allowing that "the concept may play a role under the functional test used to determine who
is a 'part of a covered organization."); see also Mortlock, supra note 6, at 386 (presenting a
"membership model" for determining which individuals are "part of' an organization within the scope
of the AUMF).
92. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1021(b).
93. Compare Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (accepting the provision of the Administration's
formulation of its detention powers which included those providing "substantial support" to enemy
organizations), with Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (rejecting "substantial support" as an independent basis
for detention).
94. In Al-Bihani, in an opinion since called into some doubt, Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1,
I (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., Ginsburg, Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Garland & Griffith, JJ.,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc), the D.C. Circuit panel upheld this approach as
constitutional. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878. The court analogized to the "burden-shifting" scheme
approved in Hamdi, "in which the government need only present 'credible evidence that the habeas
petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria' before 'the onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut that
evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the criteria,"' reasoning that that
description "mirrors a preponderance standard." Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34
(2004) (plurality opinion)). Although the court accepted a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard as
constitutional, it emphasized that its "opinion does not endeavor to identify what standard would
represent the minimum required by the Constitution," opening up the possibility that a lower standard of
proof might suffice. Id. In Hamdi, Justice O'Connor also suggested that it may be appropriate to adopt a
presumption in favor of the government's evidence, "so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable
one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided." Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (plurality opinion); see
also Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (relying on Al-Bihani to hold that the district court
did not err in holding the government to a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard). See generally
WITTES ET AL., supra note 6.
95. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34 (plurality opinion).
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generally require corroboration, although courts have diverged as to the
strength of the corroboration required. 96 There is disagreement between judges
regarding further evidentiary issues, including whether the government is
entitled to presumptions in favor of accuracy or authenticity of evidence, the
use of evidence allegedly resulting from coercion or torture, and the
appropriateness of the government's use of a "mosaic theory" of evidence. 97
This Subsection has described the scope of the 2001 AUMF and the
controversy surrounding it. It has also discussed the 2012 NDAA, which
effectively codifies the Administration's interpretation of detention authority
under the statute. In the context of U.S. counterterrorism efforts spread broadly
across the globe more than a decade after September 11, however, alternative
sources of detention authority that might supplement the 2001 AUMF should
still be explored. The next two Subsections consider two additional sources of
statutory authority: the 2002 AUMF and the MCA.
2. The 2002 AUMF
Much of the policy debate regarding detention has surrounded the forty-
five square miles of Guantinamo Bay and the roughly eight hundred detainees
that have at one point been housed there. Relatively little attention has been
paid to the nearly one hundred thousand individuals the United States has
98detained in Iraq during the war that began in 2002. This Subsection provides
an overview of the domestic legal authority under which these individuals were
detained.
The detentions in Iraq were justified as a matter of domestic law under
the legal authority granted in a joint resolution authorizing the use of force
against Iraq, the 2002 AUMF. The resolution authorized the President to use
the armed forces "as he determines to be necessary and appropriate" in order to
"(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing
threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security
Council Resolutions regarding Iraq."o00 The 2002 AUMF does not explicitly
mention any authority to detain individuals, but the language it shares with the
2001 AUMF suggests that detention authority is "necessary and appropriate" to
96. WiTrES ET AL., supra note 6, at 52-89.
97. See generally Jasmeet K. Ahuja & Andrew Tutt, Note, Evidentiary Rules Governing
Guantdnamo Habeas Petitions: Their Effects and Consequences, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
(forthcoming 2013).
98. See, e.g., Caroline Alexander, Last U.S.-Run Prison Handed over to Iraqis Ahead of
Withdrawal, WASH. POST, July 15, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2010/07/15/AR2010071502545.html (stating that about 100,000 detainees have been held at
Camp Cropper alone).
99. The military intervention and detentions were justified under international law by a series
of United Nations mandates and, when the final mandate expired, under the bilateral agreements
between the United States and the Iraqi governments. See Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited
War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis ofPresidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 463-76
(2011) (describing the U.N. mandates and the bilateral agreements that superseded them).
100. 2002 AUMF, supra note 16, § 3.
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carrying out authorized military force.' 0 Unlike the 2001 AUMF, however, it
is geographically limited, applying only to the "threat posed by Iraq" and
Security Council Resolutions "regarding Iraq."
The continuing validity of the 2002 AUMF as a source of detention
authority is a subcomponent of a larger question: does the 2002 AUMF still
provide legitimacy for any U.S. military operations in Iraq? The purpose-
oriented clauses of the resolution suggest that the document should cease to be
a source of legal authority once these conditions have been met. The extent to
which the first condition, defending the United States "against the continuing
threat posed by Iraq," is satisfied turns on the nature of the threat contemplated
by Congress. Some have argued that this threat should be limited to the
existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), while others have
articulated a broader construction of this threat to encompass the post-invasion
insurgency.10 2 The second prong of the 2002 AUMF is less controversial, as
the final U.N. Security Council Resolution expired at the end of 2009.1o3 The
Bush Administration justified a continuing U.S. presence in Iraq based on a
combination of bilateral agreements with the Iraqi government, the 2001
AUMF, the 2002 AUMF, and congressional support in the form of
appropriations.104 With the exception of the 2002 AUMF, all of these
justifications provided questionable domestic authority to continue active
military operations in Iraq after the fall of the Hussein government-and, by
extension, detention-without renewed congressional authorization. 05
101. One possible explanation for the lack of explicit language referencing detention authority
is that "detention operations did not figure prominently in pre-invasion planning because the
assumptions driving that planning did not include a sustained U.S. ground presence, let alone an
extended occupation and counterinsurgency campaign." Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military
Detention Debate: Firsthand Perspectives from the Other War, 2003-2010, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 549, 563
(2011).
102. Compare Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 99, with Robert M. Chesney, Ackerman and
Hathaway on the Iraq AUMF: How Strictly Should AUMFs Be Construed?, LAWFARE (Nov. 1, 2010,
8:18 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/l l/ackerman-and-hathaway-on-the-iraq-aumf-how-strictly
-should-aumfs-be-construed; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 2102 (noting that the
Supreme Court has construed broadly congressional authorizations to the President on the basis of
delegation considerations).
103. See Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 99, at 469.
104. Id. at 471-72 (citing Declaration and Principles: Future U.S. Commitments to Iraq: Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Middle E. and S. Asia and the Subcomm. on Int'l Orgs., Human
Rights, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 11Oth Cong. 6 (2008) (written response of
David M. Satterfield, Senior Adviser, Coordinator for Iraq, U.S. Dep't of State, to Rep. Gary L.
Ackerman, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Middle E. and S. Asia)). Ambassador Satterfield cited three
separate legal rationales for the continuation of the Iraq war without additional congressional
authorization: (1) The 2002 AUMF, (2) the 2001 AUMF, and (3) the fact that "Congress has repeatedly
provided funding for the Iraq war, both in regular appropriations cycles and in supplemental
appropriations." Id.
105. While proponents of strong presidential power argue that appropriations suffice to
demonstrate congressional authorization, they seem to be outside the constitutional consensus. See, e.g.,
John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War
Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 167 (1996). The Supreme Court has held that appropriations bills can only
substitute for enactments in very limited circumstances. The Court acknowledged that appropriations are
"'Acts of Congress,"' but explained that they "have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds
for authorized programs." Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978); see also Ackerman &
Hathaway, supra note 99, at 472.
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The issue of detention authority in Iraq has become largely moot as the
U.S. military has transferred nearly all detention responsibilities to its Iraqi
counterparts. In fact, the vast majority of individuals formerly detained by the
United States in Iraq have either been released or prosecuted within the Iraqi
judicial system, with the exception of "about 200 dangerous, yet difficult to
charge, individuals." 06 Under one of the bilateral agreements governing the
ongoing relationship between the United States and Iraq, U.S. forces only have
limited powers to detain pursuant to "an Iraqi decision issued in accordance
with Iraqi law," and "persons must be handed over to competent Iraqi
authorities within 24 hours from the time of their detention or arrest." 10 While
the agreement provides limited detention authority within Iraq, it does not
purport to grant domestic legal authority for these detentions.
3. Pendent Authority To Detain Under the MCA
While the 2002 AUMF covers only detainees linked to U.S. participation
in the conflict in Iraq, some have suggested that the MCA, the statute that
governs the process for trying and punishing unprivileged combatants, may
provide detention authority of a broader scope. os The MCA does provide some
additional detention authority, but that additional authority is limited to those
individuals actually prosecuted under the statute.
Responding to the Supreme Court's holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 109
Congress passed the MCA to establish a jurisdictional and procedural
foundation for the use of military commissions. The statute authorizes military
commissions to try any "alien unprivileged enemy belligerent," which includes
any individual, other than a privileged belligerent, who (a) has engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; (b) has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners; or (c) was a part of al-Qaeda at the time of the alleged
offense." 0 Military commissions are granted jurisdiction to try listed offenses
(such as murder, attacking civilians, and taking hostages), as well as aiding the
enemy, spying, and violations of war, whether the offense is committed before,
106. Chesney, supra note 101, at 599.
107. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the
Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During Their
Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, art. 22, paras. 1-2, Nov. 17, 2008, available at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20081119_SOFAFINAL_AGREEDTEXT.pdf, see
also Brian J. Bill, Detention Operations in Iraq: A View from the Ground, in 86 INTERNATIONAL LAW
STUDIES, THE WAR IN IRAQ: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 411, 416-17 (Raul A. Pedrozo ed., 2010) (describing
the thinking behind the policy transition to an Iraqi law enforcement model).
108. Similar to the 2009 MCA, supra note 17, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L.
109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005), arguably could be read as a (post-hoc) legislative ratification of the
executive's policy of detention up to that point. However, the Detainee Treatment Act contains no
authorization for detention in itself, and neither the Obama Administration nor any of the habeas rulings
in post-September 11 terrorism cases have relied upon the DTA for advancing detention authority
arguments.
109. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
110. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7) (2006). Privileged belligerents are those "belonging to one of the
eight categories enumerated in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War." Id. § 948a(6).
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on, or after September 11, 2001.1" The MCA states, moreover, that military
commissions may proceed against aliens who are members of groups covered
by the 2001 AUMF as well as those who are not members but nonetheless
provide support to such groups.112 Importantly, the MCA is silent on the issue
of detention authority, and the legislative history explicitly notes that the statute
was not intended to define the scope of the President's authority to detain.' 13
The D.C. Circuit panel's opinion in Al-Bihani v. Obama, which was cast
into doubt in subsequent proceedings,1 4 suggested that the scope of the MCA
includes detention authority." 5 Speaking for the panel, Judge Janice Rogers
Brown concluded that anyone subject to a military commission under the MCA
is a fortiori subject to indefinite detention without trial as well. According to
the panel's logic, anyone who has "purposefully and materially supported
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners" could be
detained.116 The opinion applied a lower bar for indefinite detention than under
the 2001 AUMF by allowing the government to detain under the MCA those
who provide independent support to an AUMF-covered organization, even
without proof of membership in that organization, and even if there is no
intention to prosecute under the MCA." By doing so, Al-Bihani suggested a
substantial expansion of detention authority.
The Al-Bihani panel erred in deriving expansive stand-alone detention
authority from the MCA's purely jurisdictional and procedural provisions." 8 It
is uncontroversial that individuals subject to trial by a military commission will
also be detained-at least for the period of the trial. But the Al-Bihani panel
opinion suggests that the authority to prosecute always and necessarily implies
the authority to detain"' 9-and that this authority to detain can be unhinged
111. 10 U.S.C. § 948d; see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 904, 950t, 906.
112. Military Commissions Act of 2006, sec. 3, §§ 948a(l), 948c, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120
Stat. 2600, 2601-02; Military Commissions Act of 2009, sec. 1802, §§ 948a(7), 948b(a), 948c (codified
as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-948c).
113. See S. REP. No. 111-288, at 862-63 (2009) (Conf. Rep.) [hereinafter Conference Report]
(noting that the MCA's definition of "unprivileged enemy belligerents" is included only for the purpose
of establishing persons subject to trial by military commission in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 948c, and
is not intended to address the scope of the authority of the United States to detain individuals in
accordance with the laws of war or for any other purpose).
114. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., Ginsburg,
Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Garland & Griffith, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) ("We
decline to en banc this case to determine the role of international law-of-war principles in interpreting
the AUMF because, as the various opinions issued in the case indicate, the panel's discussion of that
question is not necessary to the disposition of the merits.").
115. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
116. Id. (citing § 948a(1)(A)(i)).
117. WITTES ET AL., supra note 6, at 29.
118. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872 ("The provisions of the 2006 and 2009 MCAs are illuminating
in this case because the government's detention authority logically covers a category of persons no
narrower than is covered by its military commission authority. Detention authority in fact sweeps
wider. . . .").
119. This first step of the argument is itself incorrect. The government has the authority to
prosecute a criminal law violation but does not possess the authority to detain in cases where the
available penalties for the criminal law violation do not include detention. For example, certain non-
federal statutes criminalize activities such as jaywalking, speeding, or wildlife violations as
misdemeanors and limit the punishment to a fine. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1701 (indicating
that Class A and Class B traffic offenses have a maximum penalty of $100). On a federal level, certain
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from the authority to prosecute, thereby allowing the government to detain
individuals without any intention of prosecuting them. Under this formulation,
Congress's vesting of prosecutorial authority was enough to supply the
President with stand-alone detention authority. Yet this expansive reading of
the MCA is not only inconsistent with specific statutory language to the
contrary-in which Congress expressly stated that it did not intend to address
the scope of authority to detainl 20 -it is also inconsistent with basic principles
of detention authority pursuant to prosecution authority. To detain someone
suspected of murder, for example, the government must intend to prosecute that
person for murder. Similarly, in order to detain an individual pursuant to the
MCA, the government must intend to prosecute that individual under the
MCA.121
While the MCA may provide detention authority for some individuals
who are not covered by the 2001 AUMF-for example, because they are not
members or supporters of al-Qaeda or the Taliban-the government must not
only intend to prosecute, but it must charge and prosecute within a reasonable
timeframe. Article 14(3)(c) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) requires that trials take place "without undue delay." 2 2 The
Human Rights Committeel 23 has noted that this applies "not only to the time by
which a trial should commence, but also the time by which it should end and
statutes establish maximum fines for certain acts and exclude the power to detain. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §
502(a) (2006) ("If the persons, corporation, or association owning or controlling any railroad or other
bridge shall, after receiving notice [that their railroad or bridge is obstructing navigation waters], as
hereinbefore required, from the Secretary of Transportation and within the time prescribed by him
willfully fail or refuse to remove the same or to comply with the lawful order of the Secretary of the
Army in the premises, such persons, corporation, or association shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000. . . ."). Other
statutes criminalize activity perpetrated by corporations but do not allow for detention authority. See,
e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.51(b) ("If a corporation or association is adjudged guilty of an offense that
provides a penalty including imprisonment, or that provides no specific penalty, a court may sentence
the corporation or association to pay a fine in an amount fixed by the court, not to exceed: (1) $20,000 if
the offense is a felony of any category; (2) $10,000 if the offense is a Class A or Class B misdemeanor;
(3) $2,000 if the offense is a Class C misdemeanor; or (4) $50,000 if, as a result of an offense classified
as a felony or Class A misdemeanor, an individual suffers serious bodily injury or death."). Although all
of those statutes suggest that detention authority does not automatically flow from prosecutorial
authority, the nature of the underlying crimes in these provisions, such as crossing a street when the
traffic light is green, obviously differs significantly from the nature of the crimes outlined in the MCA.
The point here is simply that those examples illustrate that the power to prosecute for a violation of
criminal law does not always entail a power to detain.
120. See Conference Report, supra note 113.
121. Many of the current detainees at Guantinamo Bay would likely not be subject to
prosecution under the MCA because they have not committed any crimes. See, e.g., Editorial, Obama
and Guantanamo, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123258578172604569.html
("[M]any of the Guantanamo prisoners haven't committed crimes per se but are dedicated American
enemies and too dangerous to let go. Other cases involve evidence that is insufficient for trial but still
sufficient to determine that release is an unacceptable security risk.").
122. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(c)(3), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
123. The Human Rights Committee has the competence "to receive and consider
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by
that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant." Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992. See 138 Cong. Rec.
S4781-01 (Apr. 2, 1992).
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judgment be rendered; all stages must take place 'without undue delay."'
1 24
Lengthy pre-trial detention constitutes a violation of 14(3)(c) 12 and, although
the Committee has not specified a particular timeframe, it has found delays of
twenty-two months,126 two years, 127 and twenty-nine months128 to violate the
right to trial without undue delay. When read in light of this fundamental
guarantee, the MCA does not provide the authority to detain individuals
indefinitely under the pretext of intent to prosecute, but only where they are
prosecuted "without undue delay."
Jurisdiction under the MCA is also disputed for certain subject matters.
For example, the D.C. Circuit recently held that the crime of providing material
support for terrorism falls outside the scope of the Military Commissions Act
and therefore is not subject to prosecution before the military commissions.' 29
If the decision stands, it will significantly undermine the capacity of
prosecutors to charge detainees before the Military Commissions. Moreover,
human rights organizations have generally been critical of the MCA on due
process and independence grounds,o30  and the Committee has expressed
concern about the trial of civilians by military courts and has indicated that
such trials "should be very exceptional and take place under conditions which
genuinely afford the full guarantees stipulated in article 14."'13
In sum, while the MCA may provide detention authority for prosecutions
of some persons who do not fall under the 2001 AUMF-where such persons
124. Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights 13, art. 14, 10 (Twenty-first session, 1984), Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, general cmt. 13, at 135, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/l/Rev.6, at 135 (2003).
125. See Sextus v. Trinidad & Tobago, M 7.2, 7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/818/1998 (U.N.
Human Rights Comm., July 16, 2001).
126. See id. 7.2.
127. See C. Smart v. Trinidad & Tobago, 1 10.2, U.N. Doc. GAOR, A/53/40, vol. II (U.N.
Human Rights Comm., July 29, 1998).
128. See J. Leslie v. Jamaica, 9.3, U.N. Doc. GAOR, A/53/40 (vol. II) (U.N. Human Rights
Comm., July 31, 1998).
129. See Hamdan v. United States, No. 11-1257, slip op. at 5-6 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 2012); see
also Brief for National Institute of Military Justice, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United
States v. Al Bahlul, No. 11-1324 (2009), 2012 WL 2458066 (arguing that material support does not
constitute a violation of the law of nations and is therefore outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
military commissions); Stephen 1. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Military
Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 295 (2010).
130. See, e.g., Military Commissions, AMNESTY INT'L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work
lissues/security-and-human-rights/fair-trials (last visited Nov. 11, 2012); US: New Legislation on
Military Commissions Doesn't Fix Fundamental Flaws, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 8, 2009),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/08/us-new-legislation-military-commissions-doesn-t-fix-fundamental
-flaws.
131. General Comment 13, supra note 124, art. 14, 1 10 ("The Committee notes the existence,
in many countries, of military or special courts which try civilians. This could present serious problems
as far as the equitable, impartial and independent administration of justice is concemed. Quite often the
reason for the establishment of such courts is to enable exceptional procedures to be applied which do
not comply with normal standards of justice. While the Covenant does not prohibit such categories of
courts, nevertheless the conditions which it lays down clearly indicate that the trying of civilians by such
courts should be very exceptional and take place under conditions which genuinely afford the full
guarantees stipulated in article 14.").
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are to be imminently prosecuted under that statute for violations of the law of
nations-the nature and extent of that authority remains controversial.
This Section has argued that the three existing sources of statutory
authority for detention provide highly circumscribed authority to detain persons
suspected of engaging in terrorist activities. The next Section turns to a
separate-and, as we shall argue, even more restricted-source of presidential
authority to detain: the President's role as Commander-in-Chief under the U.S.
Constitution.
B. Constitutional Authority: The President's Article II Power To
Detain
After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration argued that it
had expansive detention authority under Article II of the Constitution because
detention of the enemy is among the core functions of the President as
Commander-in-Chief.132 This position was widely criticized,'33 and the Obama
Administration has refrained from making similar arguments.134 Instead, it has
relied on the 2001 AUMF to justify military detention of individuals
apprehended in the course of counterterrorism operations.135 Courts have
declined to reach the issue of whether the President has independent Article II
detention authority in the global fight against terrorism and have generally
analyzed the scope of that detention authority under the 2001 AUMF. 3 6 This
Section addresses two questions: (1) does the President have independent
Article II authority to detain; and (2) if yes, what is the scope of that authority?
To the extent that detention authority is incident to the authority to engage in
military operations, the President may have independent detention authority,
but only in the very limited settings where he has independent military
authority.
1. Source ofArticle II Detention Authority
The President's law-of-war detention authority is ancillary to the
President's authority as Commander-in-Chief to conduct military operations. It
follows that the scope of the President's independent Article II detention
authority cannot exceed the scope of his power to engage in military
operations.
132. Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 13-14, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.
2002) (No. 02-6895).
133. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman, supra note 20; Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in
Chief 81 IND. L.J. 1169 (2006).
134. See Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 10
(relying on the 2001 AUMF and not on Article II for detention authority).
135. See id.; see also WITTES ET AL., supra note 6, at 27-28.
136. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004).
146
The Power To Detain
The President's detention authority during armed conflict is grounded in
the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief.137 The plurality opinion in
Hamdi stated that "[t]he capture and detention of lawful combatants and the
capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement
and practice,' are 'important incident[s] of war'",138 and that "detention ... is a
fundamental incident of waging war." 3 9 As a result, the plurality concluded
that the 2001 AUMF's authorization for the use of "necessary and appropriate
force" unmistakably includes the authority to detain. 140 This reasoning was
echoed in subsequent cases.141 In a brief to the Fourth Circuit, the government
had also argued that "the President's core functions as Commander-in-Chief in
wartime [include] detention,"l42 and Justice Thomas treated detention authority
as part of the President's war powers in his dissent in Hamdi.143 While there is
disagreement about the scope of the President's Article II detention authority,
there is nonetheless broad consensus that the authority arises from the
President's Commander-in-Chief powers.144 Hence, the scope of the
President's authority to engage in law-of-war detention in the absence of
statutory authorization is limited to the scope of his independent authority to
use military force.
The Court's reasoning in Hamdi and elsewhere 45 suggests two further
restrictions on the President's Article II detention authority. First, the detention
must be a fundamental or necessary incident to the specific type of military
operation under consideration. This follows directly from the reasoning in
Hamdi and subsequent cases-that detention is included in "necessary and
appropriate force" because it is a fundamental incident of the use of such force.
In order for ancillary detention authority to exist, therefore, it must be a
fundamental incident to the specific type of military operation the President has
137. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942);
Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
138. 542 U.S. at 518 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28, 30).
139. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733; Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 391 (4th Cir.
2005); Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 62 (D.D.C. 2009) ("[D]etention is an exercise of the
state's 'right to use force."'); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 n.13 (D.D.C. 2009); al-Marri v.
Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 680 (D.S.C. 2005).
142. Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 13, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2004)
(No. 02-6895).
143. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 587-88 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
144. It bears mentioning in this context that, in the wake of September 11, the Department of
Justice proposed a bill that would have authorized "indefinite preventive detention, without charge, of
aliens suspected of some connection to terrorist activities or groups," and Congress pointedly rejected
those provisions. Brief for the Constitution Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 9-16,
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (No. 10-98) (citing Dep't of Justice Antiterrorism Bill 2d
Draft, § 202 (Sept. 19, 2001)), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/al-Kiddjan31 201 1.pdf;
Homeland Defense: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107 Cong. 18 (2001) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy). The proposal (and rejection) of this bill indicates that neither the executive nor Congress
viewed the President as having independent Article II authority to indefinitely detain persons with ties to
terrorism within the United States and outside the circumscribed context of an authorized war or military
operation.
145. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); In re
Territo, 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946).
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independent authority to engage in. Second, the capture and detention must
have as its object the disabling of enemy combatants and the prevention of their
return to the battlefield. Hamdi, Eisentrager, and similar cases make clear that
the key purpose of detention in the course of war is to disable the enemy. 146
That is, wartime detention has a defensive purpose. Thus, to determine whether
detention authority exists, the key question is whether the military operation is
of such a nature that detention could serve the disabling defensive function
envisioned in these cases.147 Where the President has independent Article II
authority to engage in military operations and where these two additional
conditions are met, limited independent Article II detention authority likely
also exists.
2. Scope ofArticle IDetention Authority
Given the dependence of executive detention authority on the scope of the
President's Article II authority as Commander-in-Chief, the more expansive a
view one takes of the President's independent military powers, the more
expansive the detention authority that follows. Broadly speaking, there are
three views about the President's substantive powers under Article II and their
implications for the scope of detention authority. 148
At one extreme is the view that the "Constitution vests the President with
exclusive authority to act as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's sole
organ in foreign affairs."149 In this view, the different powers allocated by the
146. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519 ("Because detention to prevent a combatant's return to the
battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of 'necessary and appropriate
force,' Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances
considered here."); Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 772-73 ("The alien enemy is bound by an allegiance which
commits him to lose no opportunity to forward the cause of our enemy; hence the United States,
assuming him to be faithful to his allegiance, regards him as part of the enemy resources. It therefore
takes measures to disable him from the commission of hostile acts imputed as his intention because they
are a duty to his sovereign."); Territo, 156 F.2d at 145 ("The object of capture is to prevent the captured
individual from serving the enemy.").
147. Two cautionary notes should be made. First, Hamdi, Quirin, and Eisentrager were all
decided in the setting of a statutorily authorized war or military operation; thus, the arguments presented
here are arguments by analogy only. Based on the reasoning these courts use in referencing or
discussing detention authority, some more general conclusions may be drawn, but they are not by any
means obvious or settled law. Moreover, the analysis presented here brackets questions about the
authorized duration of detention and instead focuses solely on the initial authority to seize or capture in
the course of military operations. Additional restrictions that limit the President's detention authority
include all applicable law-of-war limitations, such as the well-settled rule that privileged combatants
must be released at the end of hostilities and unprivileged combatants must be tried and convicted or
released at the end of hostilities. However, in a setting where there is no anticipated end to the hostilities
in sight and where detention for the duration of hostilities begins to approach indefinite detention, this
traditional approach "may unravel" and different or additional limitations and procedural protections
may apply. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521. For a more detailed discussion of the problem of duration, see infra
Section III.B.
148. This summary follows the basic framework laid out in Barron & Lederman, supra note 20.
149. Brief for Respondents-Appellants at *13, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 378 F.3d 426 (4th Cir.
2002) (No. 02-6895) (emphasis added); see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 581 (Thomas, J., dissenting); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black)
635, 670 (1862); John C. Yoo, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum on the President's Constitutional
Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25,
2001), http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm [hereinafter Yoo, OLC Memo].
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Constitution among the branches are "separate and distinct powers," meaning
that there is no overlap in the substance of these powers and "Congress may not
make rules and regulations that burden the President's ability to act as
commander in chief."150 In John Yoo's words, "[t]he power of the President is
at its zenith under the Constitution when the President is directing military
operations of the armed forces, because the power of Commander-in-Chief is
assigned solely to the President."' 51 As Justice Thomas stated in his dissenting
opinion in Hamdi, authority over matters relating to national security, including
detention, is vested exclusively in the President "principally because the
structural advantages of a unitary Executive are essential in these domains."1 5 2
He concludes that "the President has constitutional authority to protect the
national security and. . . this authority carries with it broad discretion" 5 3 and a
"need to be free from interference." 5 4 This approach would give the President
very expansive military authority, including detention authority, and would
regard this authority as unencumbered by congressional limitations.
At the other end of the spectrum is the view that the Commander-in-Chief
Clause confers no substantive powers, and that this designation is a purely
hierarchical one.155 On this view, the President lacks independent detention
authority under Article II, and his authority to detain is entirely statutory. This
interpretation finds some support in the historical use of the term "commander
in chief" 5 6 but, as David Barron and Martin Lederman note, ultimately cannot
be reconciled with "a long line of Supreme Court precedent recognizing a range
of distinct substantive powers that the Commander-in-Chief may exercise in the
absence of legislative authorization."157
The intermediate view, grounded in Justice Jackson's concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,158 holds that the President's
Commander-in-Chief power is a component of a shared war power. On this
view, presidential authority does not preclude regulation by Congress. Instead,
"[t]he Constitution ... means for the President and Congress each to wield
aspects of the war power, which means that the powers should be understood in
a way that accommodates the exercise of each and recognizes that they overlap
and interrelate."159 This approach yields a more flexible model that sees some
150. Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in Chief 81 IND. L.J. 1169, 1170(2006).
151. Yoo, OLC Memo, supra note 149.
152. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 580 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 581.
154. Id. at 582.
155. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM
AND ITS AFTERMATH 5 (1993); Barron & Lederman, supra note 20, at 730; Ingrid Brunk Wuerth,
International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered,
106 MICH. L. REV. 61, 83 (2007). See generally Barron & Lederman, supra note 20, at 772-800.
156. Wuerth, supra note 155, at 67, 83.
157. Barron & Lederman, supra note 20, at 729-30.
158. 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("While the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers
into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy
but reciprocity.").
159. Kinkopf, supra note 150, at 1170.
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of the President's powers as "core" powers that are "preclusive" of
congressional regulation and others as more "peripheral" and therefore "non-
preclusive" of such regulation. 1o This model envisions a distribution of power
where the President's actions can be circumscribed by Congress even where he
acts in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief.161 Thus, even though the
President's detention authority is part of his authority as Commander-in-Chief,
it does not exist independently of Congress's concurrent power to declare
warl62 and to regulate aspects of the conduct of war.163 Numerous cases
support this view, holding that the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief
may be limited by Congress,' and that the War Powers Resolution places
additional constraints on the President's exercise of his Commander-in-Chief
authority:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce
U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are
exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. 165
While there are different views about how far the War Powers Resolution
limits the President's powers in practicel66 and about how to sort preclusive
160. See generally Barron & Lederman, supra note 20, at 726-29.
161. See generally Wuerth, supra note 155, at 91-95 (discussing marque and reprisal authority
and other relevant powers vested in Congress and their implications for the scope of the President's
authority as Commander-in-Chief).
162. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11; see Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (D.D.C.
1990) ("To the extent that this unambiguous direction requires construction or explanation, it is provided
by the framers' comments that they felt it to be unwise to entrust the momentous power to involve the
nation in a war to the President alone; Jefferson explained that he desired 'an effectual check to the Dog
of war'; James Wilson similarly expressed the expectation that this system would guard against
hostilities being initiated by a single man. Even Abraham Lincoln, while a Congressman, said more than
half a century later that 'no one man should hold the power of bringing' war upon us.").
163. For the view that the war powers are overlapping shared powers, see Massachusetts v.
Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1971) ("[T]he war power of the country is an amalgam of powers,
some distinct and others less sharply limned. In certain respects, the executive and the Congress may act
independently. The Congress may without executive cooperation declare war, thus triggering treaty
obligations and domestic emergency powers. The executive may without Congressional participation
repel attack, perhaps catapulting the country into a major conflict. But beyond these independent
powers, each of which has its own rationale, the Constitutional scheme envisages the joint participation
of the Congress and the executive in determining the scale and duration of hostilities.").
164. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804) (standing for the proposition that Congress
may prescribe statutory limitations on the President's executive authority as Commander-in-Chief);
Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801) (deciding a question of executive authority to capture neutral vessel
by analyzing statutory not inherent authority); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 45 (1800) (Paterson, J.) ("As far
as Congress tolerated and authorized the war on our part, so far may we proceed in hostile operations.");
see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 662 (1952) (Clark, J., concurring)
("[W]here Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis confronting the
President, he must follow those procedures in meeting the crisis; but .. . in the absence ofsuch action by
Congress, the President's independent power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation
confronting the nation." (emphasis added)).
165. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982).
166. It is unclear how far the War Powers Resolution extends in limiting the President's
authority, since courts have tended either to find the question of whether the executive's actions were
authorized by statute non-justiciable for reasons of standing or ripeness or under the political question
doctrine, or to find that the President had statutory authorization because Congress approved financing
150
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core powers from non-preclusive shared powers,167 there does appear to be a
broad consensus that the President has independent Article II authority to
conduct defensive military operations in very circumscribed settingsl68 -
paradigmatically, where he acts to repel an attack on the United States;169 to
defend U.S. citizens abroad; 170 and to defend U.S. embassies, consulates, and
of the war effort or because it retrospectively ratified the war effort. However, the mere practice of
deciding by looking to statutory authorization (even where a finding that there was one seems strained)
reinforces the view that Congress may limit the President's exercise of his Commander-in-Chief powers
if it so chooses. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 635 (1862); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Doe v.
Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003); Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Mass. v.
Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971); Rappenecker v.
United States, 509 F. Supp. 1024 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
167. See generally Barron & Lederman, supra note 20, at 753-61 (discussing possible
distinctions to define the scope of the President's preclusive Commander-in-Chief powers but finding
none satisfactory).
168. Presidents have also asserted the authority to engage unilaterally in humanitarian
intervention without congressional authorization where the operations are of limited "nature, scope, and
duration" and where the President determines it is in the national interest to do so. E.g. Authority to Use
Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 6-9 (2011); see also Authority To Use U.S. Military Forces in
Somalia, 16 Op. O.L.C. 6, 11 (1992) ("Nor is the president's power strictly limited to the protection of
American citizens in Somalia. Past military interventions that extended to the protection of foreign
nationals provide precedent for action to protect endangered Somalians and other non-United States
citizens."). To the extent such authority exists, the President may also have ancillary detention authority
in the context of resulting hostilities.
169. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 893 n.l (1970); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2
Black) at 668 ("If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but
bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without
waiting for any special legislative authority. And whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or States
organized in rebellion, it is none the less a war, although the declaration of it be 'unilateral."');
Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d at 26, 31-32 (1971); see also EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United
States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that courts cannot question the President's
determination that the plant's destruction was a necessary and appropriate response to the imminent
threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities). Scholars also have widely accepted the
President's power to repel an attack on the United States. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL
DIPLOMACY 84 (1990); see, e.g., Elia V. Pirozzi, The War Power and a Career-Minded Congress:
Making the Case for Legislative Reform, Congressional Term Limits, and Renewed Respect for the
Intent of the Framers, 27 Sw. U. L. Rev. 185, 194-98 (1997).
170. This was recognized as early as 1860 in Durand v. Hollins, which reasoned that U.S.
citizens abroad are entitled to protection, and that threats of violence against U.S. citizens abroad cannot
be anticipated and frequently require prompt action. 8 F. Cas. 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860).
Consequently, the court concluded that the duty to protect the lives and property of citizens abroad must
rest with the President. Id. Numerous presidents have since invoked this authority, for example during
the Iran hostage crisis, see Presidential Powers Relating to the Situation in Iran, 4A Op. O.L.C. 115, 127
(1979), in order to send troops to Somalia, see Auth. to Use Military Forces in Somalia, 16 Op. O.L.C.
6, 8 (1992) ("[T]he President's role under our Constitution as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive
vests him with the constitutional authority to order United States troops abroad to further national
interests such as protecting the lives of Americans overseas. Accordingly, where, as here, United States
government personnel and private citizens are participating in a lawful relief effort in a foreign nation,
we conclude that the president may commit United States troops to protect those involved in the relief
effort."); see also Pirozzi, supra note 169, at 200-202 (stating that the President has the authority to
initiate military actions to protect U.S. citizens abroad), and, perhaps less persuasively, in assessing the
legality of deploying troops in Haiti, see Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op.
O.L.C. 173, 176 n.3 (1994); Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Haiti (2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2004/legalityofdeployment.pdf. Given the purpose of this authority,
however, it is very limited in nature. See GLENNON, supra note 169, at 86 ("[T]he president does have
the power to use the armed forces, in the face of congressional silence, in emergency situations
involving the imminent threat of grievous harm to American citizens and nationals."). Moreover, at least
one scholar suggests that the use of force for this purpose must be proportional; that this authority is
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military bases abroad. 171 However, "when the President acts on his own
constitutional authority, the force employed must be strictly tied to and justified
by the circumstances initially permitting the use of force."1 7 2 Any detention
authority the President may have under his defensive war powers is similarly
limited.
In sum, detention authority under Article II derives from the President's
authority as Commander-in-Chief. Its scope can be no greater than the scope of
the President's independent war powers. Independent Article II detention
authority therefore exists only in those rare situations in which the President
has unilateral authority to initiate and conduct military operations.
As U.S. counterterrorism operations become less directly tied to the
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the 2001 AUMF is
becoming more tenuous as a central source of detention authority for the U.S.
government. The 2002 AUMF only provides limited detention authority within
Iraq-authority that is also drawing to a close with the conclusion of U.S.
military combat in that country. Detention authority under the MCA is limited
to alien enemy combatants prosecuted for law-of-war violations in military
commissions under the MCA. Finally, the President's independent
constitutional detention authority exists only in very limited circumstances,
because Article II detention authority rests on the President's independent
authority to use military force.
limited to situations where diplomatic remedies have been exhausted; and that it does not exist in
situations where "people ... voluntarily enter ultrahazardous areas" and therefore have "no reasonable
expectation of rescue by the United States armed forces." GLENNON, supra note 169, at 87.
171. See GLENNON, supra note 169, at 87. While there do not appear to have been any legal
analyses specifically of the President's detention authority when acting to defend U.S. embassies or
consulates abroad, such authority would similarly exist as ancillary to military engagement authority,
and would similarly be limited by its relatedness to the type of operation required to defend U.S.
positions abroad. Notably, courts have not been inclined to review the President's determination that a
particular action was necessary for the defense of U.S. personnel and facilities abroad. See EI-Shifa
Pharm. Ind. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1362-65 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that courts cannot
question the President's determination that the plant's destruction was a necessary and appropriate
response to the imminent threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities). When the
President undertakes actions solely to defend holdings abroad, it is likely that these operations would be
very limited in scope and duration. As a result, it is highly unlikely that detention authority exists in
these contexts, except for the very limited purpose of disabling combatants and preventing them from
returning to the battlefield while the military operation is ongoing.
172. GLENNON, supra note 169, at 86; see Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (D.D.C.
1990).
173. See, e.g., Admiral Jonathan Greenhert, Sea Change: The Navy Pivots to Asia, FOREIGN
POLICY (Nov. 14, 2012) ("Our nation's security priorities, and our military, are in transition. In the
Middle East, we ended the war in Iraq and are reducing ground troops in Afghanistan with the shift of
security responsibilities to Kabul."); John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and
Counterterrorism, Remarks at Harvard Law School: Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our
Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011) ("Simply put, [newly proposed detention legislation] is not an
approach we should pursue. Not when we have al-Qa'ida on the ropes. Our counterterrorism
professionals-regardless of the administration in power-need the flexibility to make well-informed
decisions about where to prosecute terrorist suspects." (emphasis added)); Oona A. Hathaway & Bruce
Ackerman, The World After Bin Laden, WASH. POST, May 3, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/topic-a-the-world-after-bin-laden/2011/05/02/AFF7ujhFstory.html.
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As we shall see in the following Part, these are not the only limits on the
government's law-of-war detention authority. International law-both the law
of armed conflict and human rights law-provides an independent set of
limitations on the government's authority to detain suspected terrorists.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW LIMITATIONS ON LAW-OF-WAR DETENTION
International law places limits on detention authority. These limits are
incorporated into domestic law in several ways. First, they may be incorporated
into the affirmative statutory authority that Congress grants the President. The
government has explicitly acknowledged, for example, that the statutory grant
of detention authority in the 2001 AUMF is interpreted in light of international
law. In a brief before the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the United
States explained that "[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war rules governing
international armed conflicts .. . must inform the interpretation of the detention
authority."1 74 This position is consistent with the Hamdi plurality's use of
international law to interpret congressional grants of war-making authority as
well as with longstanding historical practice.1 75 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
frequently used international law as an interpretive tool for construing statutes
to avoid conflict with "the law of nations" where possible.'7 6
Second, many treaty provisions have been directly implemented into
domestic law by Congress. Although international agreements now face a
174. Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 1. The
Administration applies this framework to detention power, arguing that "[t]he president also has the
authority under the AUMF to detain in this armed conflict those persons whose relationship to al-Qaida
or the Taliban would, in appropriately analogous circumstances in a traditional international armed
conflict, render them detainable." Id.
175. Early Supreme Court cases held that customary norms automatically applied in armed
conflict absent congressional abrogation. E.g., The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815)
("Till ... an act be passed, the Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the
land."); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) ("[C]ongress may authorize general hostilities,
in which case the general laws of war apply to our situation. . . ."); see Brief for Non-Governmental
Organizations and Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 3-4, Al-
Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-5051) ("In conflict after conflict, the Supreme
Court has relied upon the laws of war as default rules governing the conduct of hostilities, applicable
absent explicit statutory language to the contrary.").
176. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains . . . ."). The use of this canon of interpretation has continued until the present, both implicitly
and explicitly. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 549 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(relying on the government position that the "usages of war" inform the 2001 AUMF's interpretation);
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1953) (using "prevalent doctrines of international law" to
interpret the Jones Act of 1920); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S.
10, 21 (1963) (relying on a "well-established rule of international law" to construe the jurisdictional
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act). In the course of giving content to the statute, the laws
of war may place limitations on its grant of authority. Suggestions to the contrary by the D.C. Circuit in
Al-Bihani v. Obama, in which a panel denied the premise that the war powers granted by the 2001
AUMF were limited by the international laws of war, Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir.
2010), were later identified as dicta, Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J.,
Ginsburg, Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Garland & Griffith, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en
banc) ("We decline to en banc this case to determine the role of international law-of-war principles in
interpreting the AUMF because, as the various opinions issued in the case indicate, the panel's
discussion of that question is not necessary to the disposition of the merits.").
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presumption of non-self-execution,in a number of federal statutes explicitly
enforce both human rights and humanitarian law treaties. For instance, the War
Crimes Act of 1996 implements parts of the Geneva Conventions and Hague
Convention IV,' and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 implements
the Convention Against Torture.' These and similar statutes provide an
additional constraint on detention authority. Absent a clear statement to the
contrary, subsequent legislation, such as the 2001 AUMF or 2012 NDAA,
cannot be understood to abrogate these prior statutes.180
Even where international law requirements are not incorporated into
domestic law, they still impose obligations as a matter of international law.
Transgressing these norms would put the United States in violation of its
international commitments, could alienate allies in the global fight against
terrorism, make it more difficult to encourage others' compliance with
international law, and make the United States a less credible partner for future
agreements. 181
For present purposes, it is enough to say that the international law of
war -82along with human rights law-constrains detention authority as a
matter of international law, and often also as a matter of domestic law. Law-of-
war limitations on detention derive from jus ad bellum restrictions on initial
capture and jus in bello due process and humane treatment requirements.183
Human rights law also provides both independent and overlapping limits on
law-of-war detention authority. This Part considers each of these bodies of law
in turn.
A. Jus ad Bellum
Jus ad bellum principles governing the commencement of hostilities place
limits on U.S. law-of-war detention authority regardless of whether the source
of the authority is statutory or constitutional. In many cases, including the 2001
AUMF, the 2002 AUMF, the 2012 NDAA, and Article II, detention authority is
a necessary incident of a grant of authority to use military force. Hence the
177. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy & Sarah
Solow, International Law at Home, 27 YALE. J. INT'L L. 51 (2012).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
180. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974) ("In the absence of some affirmative
showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when
the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable. . . . 'The intention of the legislature to repeal must be
clear and manifest."' (quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939))); The Vera Cruz,
10 App. Cas. 59, 68 (1884) ("[W]here there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and
sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you
are not to hold that earlier legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of
such general words, without any evidence of a particular intention to do so.").
181. For a discussion of the sanctions that states face when they violate international law, see
Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121
YALE L.J. 252 (2011).
182. This term is used to apply tojus ad bellum and jus in bello collectively.
183. For a discussion of the international law regarding indefinite detention, see Jenks &
Jensen, supra note 6, at 43.
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same ad bellum principles governing the lawfulness of strikes or military
operations govern the lawfulness of detention in those same operations.
In brief, jus ad bellum provides that the use of military force, including
detention, is only authorized where the host state has consented to, the Security
Council has authorized, or self-defense has necessitated the use of such military
force.184 Although some scholars have dismissed the relevance ofjus ad bellum
to detention of suspected terrorists, 85 the language of the 2001 AUMF
explicitly references fundamental ad bellum concepts. It asserts the "right[] to
self-defense," and, in light of the September 11, 2001 "acts of treacherous
violence," characterizes the hostilities it authorizes as "necessary and
appropriate," closely echoing the ad bellum notions of necessity and
proportionality.' 86 These references appear to signal Congress's intention to
abide by the basic tenets ofjus ad bellum, as codified in the U.N. Charter and
interpreted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).187 It would be peculiar
for Congress to explicitly situate its statute within these norms if it intended to
authorize their violation.'8 8 While some scholars note that "for purposes of the
U.S. legal system, Congress has the authority to override international law,"' 89
the language of the 2001 AUMF seems to signal the opposite intention. As
already noted, the Administration has expressly taken this same view in its
litigation documents. Similar reasoning applies to the 2002 AUMFl 90 and to
the MCA.'91
Ad bellum compliance may therefore be understood to be incorporated
into the detention authority granted by Congress to the President. This raises a
series of questions about the scope of the statutory authority. For example,
relying on ad bellum self-defense for domestic authorization means that the
authorization must be limited to actions permitted under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter. That in turn raises questions about how to assess imminence with
respect to terrorist groups. Moreover, it would subject the "authority to detain
persons . . . engaged in hostilities against . .. coalition partners"
92 to the
procedural requirements for collective self-defense, which the ICJ has
construed to include declaration, U.N. reporting, and a formal request for
184. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; id. art. 43 para. 1; id. art. 48 para. 1; id. art. 49; id. art. 51.
185. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 2089-90.
186. 2001 AUMF, supra note 7, § 2(a).
187. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
188. Furthermore, the Charming Betsy canon, discussed supra note 176, dictates that statutes be
interpreted to comply with international law absent explicit indications to the contrary.
189. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 2089 n.180.
190. For example, the 2002 AUMF uses the same "necessary and appropriate" language used in
the 2001 AUMF. 2002 AUMF, supra note 16, pmbl. In addition, the scope of detention authority under
the 2002 AUMF is geographically limited to Iraq and temporally limited to the duration of hostilities in
Iraq and/or the temporal scope of the 2002 AUMF. See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-184, 123 Stat. 2190.
191. For example, the MCA of 2009 uses terms that clearly reference the laws of war, such as
privileged and unprivileged enemy belligerents.
192. Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 2.
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aid. 193 These limitations should be carefully considered in determining whom
the President has the authority to detain, whether by statute or under Article II
authority.
Jus ad bellum also places independent limitations on U.S. government
actions as a matter of international law. The President may be authorized as a
matter of domestic law to detain certain individuals, but if that detention
violates ad bellum principles it is prohibited as a matter of international law.
Where that international law has-like the U.N. Charter-been ratified by the
United States, it is incorporated into U.S. law by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution.194
B. Jus in Bello
Jus in bello norms also place limits on U.S. detention authority during
armed conflict. Law-of-war jus in bello norms embodied in treaties and
customary international law place limits on the President's detention authority,
unless Congress specifically overrides them. Even then they continue to apply
as a matter of international law, even though they cannot be enforced in U.S.
courts.
The conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and
associated forces is a non-international armed conflict, governed primarily by
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Common Article 3, which the
Supreme Court found binding and enforceable in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,195
provides the minimum applicable level of protection under international
humanitarian law, requiring that detainees be "treated humanely." In addition to
Common Article 3, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
regards the provisions of Article 75 of Additional Protocol 1196 (Article 75) as
customary international law and therefore applicable in non-international armed
conflict. The Obama Administration has taken the position that it intends to
treat Article 75 as legally binding in international armed conflicts, but has made
no public statements regarding the applicability of Article 75 in non-
international armed conflicts such as the conflict with al-Qaeda. 9'
193. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 199-200 (June 27).
194. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
195. 548 U.S. 557, 629-32 (2006).
196. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Article 75].
197. See The Relevance of IHL in the Context of Terrorism: 01-01-2011 FAQ, ICRC (Jan. 1,
2011), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/terrorism-ihl-210705.htm. Article 75 of the
First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions elaborates on the requirements of Common Article
3, and lays out the fundamental international humanitarian law protections guaranteed to all persons in
the power of a party to a conflict.
198. See Julian E. Barnes, Geneva Protections for al Qaeda Suspects? Read the Fine Print,
WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Mar. 14, 2011, 6:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/03/14/geneva
-protections-for-al-qaeda-suspects-read-the-fine-print.
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Nonetheless, the Administration has indicated that its practices are consistent
with Article 75.199
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions uncontroversially applies
to non-intemational armed conflicts and provides protection for persons "taking
no active part in hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid
down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause." 200 It provides, in particular, that such persons
should be treated humanely and without discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, sex, birth, wealth or any other similar criteria. 201 It prohibits "violence
to life and person" including torture and "outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment." It also provides that sentences
may not be passed without judgment "by a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples."202
Article 75 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
elaborates on these requirements, stating that any persons "who are in the
power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favorable
treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol shall be treated
humanely in all circumstances" and "without any adverse distinction based
upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar
criteria." 203 Article 75 further elaborates on the Common Article 3 prohibition
on violence to life and person, by specifying that "[v]iolence to the life, health,
or physical or mental well-being of persons" is prohibited, including torture,
humiliating or degrading treatment, or the threat of such violence or
treatment. In addition, Article 75 provides that detainees must be informed
of the reasons for their detention and must be released as soon as the
circumstances justifying their detention cease to exist.205 Article 75 also
provides for stringent due process protections, including trial by a regularly
constituted court, provision of information about the specifics of the charge and
the means to defend against it, and the presumption of innocence. 206
The duration of detention has been a particularly contentious issue in the
current conflict. The end of hostilities normally marks a bright line between
lawful and unlawful law-of-war detention. In conventional armed conflict,
privileged combatants may be held only until the end of hostilities and
199. Id.
200. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 28, art. 3.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Article 75, supra note 196.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.; see Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative
Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT'L. REV. RED CROSS 858 (2005);
Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
299-384 (2006) (discussing fundamental guarantees), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents
/publication/pcustom.htm.
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unprivileged enemy combatants may be tried for crimes committed in the
course of their belligerency. 20 7 If convicted of a crime, unprivileged enemy
combatants may be detained punitively past the end of hostilities, but, if they
are not charged with a crime or tried, they also must be released at the end of
hostilities.208 In the current conflict, the difficulty arises of determining what
would mark the end of hostilities.
The Hamdi plurality opinion acknowledged this possibility. It concluded
that under "longstanding law-of-war principles," detention of "individuals
legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants" is authorized for the
duration of the conflict.209 It explained that it understood Congress's grant of
authority to the President to use "'necessary and appropriate force' to include
the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict." 210 As long as
active combat operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan were ongoing, that
authority remained active. Yet it warned that this understanding "may
unravel."21 1
The question is whether that time of unraveling has arrived. After all, the
conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and unspecified
"associated forces" appears likely to continue indefinitely. If persons who are
"part of' or substantially support any of these groups may be detained for the
duration not simply of the active combat operations in Afghanistan, but for the
duration of U.S. counterterrorism operations, then they may be detained
indefinitely. 2 12 One D.C. District Court opinion proposed resolving this
problem by individualizing the concept of "hostilities." The Court concluded
that because there is a required nexus between detention and the government's
purpose to prevent future terrorism, when an individual defendant no longer
constitutes a threat to the United States, the government is no longer authorized
213to detain him pursuant to the 2001 AUMF. However, other courts have
214declined to adopt this approach. Further, given the difficulty of establishing
that an individual detainee no longer poses a threat to the United States or its
allies, this solution may be difficult to apply on a broad scale to resolve the
207. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 28, arts. 118, 119; see also Adam Klein &
Benjamin Wittes, Preventative Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 85,
91-92 (2011). A privileged combatant is a member of armed forces directly engaged in hostilities who
qualifies for prisoner-of-war status upon capture. An unprivileged combatant is someone who engages in
direct hostilities but who does not qualify for prisoner-of-war status because he is not a member of a
regular armed force or because he is a mercenary or has otherwise violated the laws of war.
208. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004) (plurality opinion); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789-90 (1950); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942); see also Klein &
Wittes, supra note 207, at 91-92.
209. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. In fact, the task force established by Executive Order 13493, Review of Detention Policy
Options, recommended in its report that about fifty Guantinamo detainees be "held indefinitely without
trial under the laws of war." Jenks & Jensen, supra note 5, at 43.
213. Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 28, at 2125.
214. See Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010); Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp.
2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009), aj]'d, 608 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
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problem of indefinite detention. Another option is to define "hostilities" based
on status of conflict between the United States and the particular armed group
of which the individual was a part or substantially supported at the time he was
detained. Hence, if the Afghan Taliban was no longer involved in armed
conflict with the United States, then members of that group who have not been
convicted of crimes would be released from detention. Thus far none of these
potential solutions has gained consensus support, leaving the issue of indefinite
detention deeply contested.
C. Human Rights Law
Human rights law provides additional limits on the government's
detention authority. The United States has ratified the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (CAT), all of which have provisions that are relevant to
government detention. Of particular relevance are the ICCPR prohibitions on
arbitrary deprivation of life 215 and liberty;216 the CERD prohibition on
discrimination on the basis of race or national or ethnic origin; 217 the ICCPR
prohibition on discrimination of any kind, including on the basis of religion;2 18
the ICCPR requirement that detainees be able to challenge the lawfulness of
their detention in a court of law and be released if such detention is found to be
unlawful; 2 19 the CAT and ICCPR prohibitions on torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment; 220 and the due process guarantees of the ICCPR.2 2 1 These
and other human rights limitations bear on the legality of initial and continued
detention.
There remains significant disagreement about the extraterritorial reach of
human rights law and its applicability to situations of armed conflict.222
International and foreign courts have increasingly held that human rights
215. ICCPR, supra note 122, art. 6.
216. Id. art. 9.
217. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 2,
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 216 [hereinafter CERD]; see also Report of the Comm. on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 66th-67th Sess., Aug 2-19, 2005, 1 460 U.N. Doc. A/60/18 (Aug.
19, 2005) (Gen. Rec. XXXI on the Prevention of Racial Discrimination in the Administration and
Functioning of the Criminal Justice System) (describing CERD Gen. Rec. No. 31 on the prevention of
racial discrimination in the administration and functioning of the criminal justice system); CERD Gen.
Rec. No. 30, Office High Comm'r Hum. Rt., 19 (Oct. 1, 2004), http:// www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsfl0/e3
980a673769e229cl256f8d0057cd3d (ensuring security of non-citizens, in particular with regard to
arbitrary detention).
218. ICCPR, supra note 122, art. 2.
219. Id. art. 9.
220. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment arts. 2, 4, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1984); ICCPR, supra note 122, arts. 7, 10.
221. ICCPR, supra note 122, art. 14.
222. See generally Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Relationship Between International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict, 96 MINN. L. REv. 1883 (2012)
[hereinafter Hathaway et al., IHL and HRL] (considering the relationship between human rights law and
humanitarian law in the context of armed conflict and occupation).
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obligations exist wherever a state exercises effective control.223 Moreover, both
the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) 224 have taken the position that human rights law and the law of
war are complementary because they share the same underlying purpose of
protecting human life and dignity. 22 5
In the context of detention, there are few conflicts between international
humanitarian law and human rights law. The clearest area in which the two
bodies of law diverge, however, is duration of the detention: human rights law
permits detention only until a timely trial and then only for the duration of a
lawful sentence. International humanitarian law, by contrast, contemplates
detention for the duration of the conflict. For the most part, though, the norms
provided in each context reinforce and confirm the norms provided in the other.
Human rights law provides that persons deprived of their liberty must be
treated humanely and with respect for their dignity in all circumstances, and the
Human Rights Committee considers this a non-derogable norm.2 26 Common
Article 3 and Article 75 also require humane treatment and respect in all
circumstances and prohibit treatment that is humiliating or degrading. Both
bodies of law require that persons not be detained arbitrarily or without cause
or beyond the point where a reason justifying detention ceases to exist; both
provide due process protections and a right to a fair trial; and both place
stringent limitations on the conditions of detention. Hence human rights law
provides limitations on government behavior in the detention context that
largely, though not entirely, overlap with and reinforce those provided by the
laws of war.
223. See Sarah Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 111
COLUM. L. REv. 225, 229 (2010); Hathaway et al., IHL and HRL, supra note 222, at 11. It is important
to note here, however, that the United States government has not yet expressed support for an effective-
control standard, making it an outlier among peer governments and international tribunals. See, e.g.,
Oona Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty Obligations Apply
Extraterritorially?, 43 ARIz. ST. L.J. 389 (2011) [hereinafter Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad].
224. The ICRC is an international humanitarian organization that operates in war zones and
monitors human rights abuses around the world. In addition, the ICRC maintains databases of and
periodically issues interpretive guidance on international humanitarian law. See ICRC Databases on
International Humanitarian Law, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/ihl-databases/index.jsp (last updated
Aug. 22, 2012); ICRC Resource Center, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/index.jsp. For example, it
has issued a widely-cited interpretive guidance clarifying the meaning of direct participation in
hostilities. See ICRC, Clarifying the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International
Humanitarian Law (June 30, 2009), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/feature/2009/direct
-participation-ihl-feature-020609.htm (last updated Nov. 2, 2012). While not legally binding, its
positions are widely cited as important sources for understanding the requirements IHL places on state
and non-state actors.
225. See Jakob Kellenberger, President, ICRC, Address at the 27th Annual Round Table on
Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law (Sept. 6, 2003), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0
.nsf/html/5rfgaz; U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 11. U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13 (May
26, 2004). For a general discussion of the relationship between international humanitarian law and
human rights law, see Hathaway et al., IHL and HRL, supra note 222.
226. Comm. on the Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Comm., 1950th
Meeting, July 24, 2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2 1/Rev. 1/Add. 11 (Aug. 31, 2001).
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The statutory and constitutional sources of authority for law-of-war
detention are limited in scope and may contract further with growing distance
from September 11, 2001. At the same time, international law places
independent limits on detention authority during armed conflict. There is as yet
no settled law regarding the duration of the detention of individuals captured
and detained under the 2001 AUMF, but it is well settled in international
humanitarian law that detainees who cannot or will not be prosecuted must be
released when the circumstances justifying their detention cease to exist, or
upon the cessation of hostilities. International humanitarian law also provides
clear guidance with respect to the due process protections detainees are owed
and the conditions in which they may be held. Moreover, human rights law also
applies and provides additional guidance. Thus, there are important limits on
the government's detention authority, even where there is clear statutory or
constitutional authority to detain under domestic law.
As our military prepares to exit Afghanistan, justifying counterterrorism
detention primarily through the lens of war is less tenable. As Parts II and III
have demonstrated, statutory authority for detention under the 2001 AUMF,
2002 AUMF, and MCA, and the President's independent constitutional
authority under Article II, are narrowly circumscribed and subject to significant
limitations. It is time, then, for a new approach to counterterrorism detention-
one that places criminal law detention at the center of counterterrorism efforts.
Part IV explains why criminal detention provides a legitimate and effective
source of authority that could-and should-be much more widely used as an
alternative to law-of-war detention of suspected terrorists.
IV. DETENTION OF TERRORISM SUSPECTS UNDER CRIMINAL LAW
The United States is still actively engaged in hostilities with global
terrorist organizations, but there are indications that "we're within reach of
strategically defeating al-Qaeda." 227 This development, combined with the
growing distance from the national trauma of September 11, has reinvigorated
the debate surrounding the detention and prosecution of suspected terrorists
both outside of and within the United States. Even though Congress has
recently expanded military detention and prosecution,228 prosecution in federal
court offers several key advantages over law-of-war detention, including
predictability, legitimacy, greater cooperation by defendants and international
partners, and flexibility. 229 These advantages have led a diverse set of actors-
from current Department of Defense and counterterrorism officials, 230 to
227. Craig Whitlock, Panetta: U.S. "Within Reach" of Defeating Al-Qaeda, WASH. POST, July
9, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/panetta-us-within-reach-of-defeating-al-qaeda/2011/07
/09/glQAvPpG5Hstory.html.
228. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5; see also H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. (2011) (original House
version); S. 1253, 112th Cong. (2011) (original Senate version).
229. For an in-depth analysis of these advantages from a former Department of Justice National
Security Division lawyer, see David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT'L
SEC. L. & POL'Y 1, 50-70 (2011).
230. See, e.g., Jeh Charles Johnson, Speech at Heritage Foundation, Oct. 18, 2011,
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/20111018_Jeh-Johnson-Heritage-Speech.pdf
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former Bush Administration officials,2 3 1 to the Washington Post editorial
board2 32 -to support the prosecution and detention of individuals through the
federal courts, despite Congress's recently expressed preference for law-of-war
detention.
In some cases, prosecution in federal court is the only available option for
prosecuting an accused terrorist. Federal antiterrorism statutes are extensive
and provide statutory authority to prosecute individuals who are part of or
supporting terrorist groups without direct ties to forces associated with al-
Qaeda or the Taliban (and therefore outside the scope of the 2001 AUMF or the
233NDAA), and independently operating terrorists who are inspired by, but are
not part of or associated with, al-Qaeda or the Taliban. 23 4 These statutes also
reach persons or citizens who, because they are apprehended in the United
States, cannot be tried under the MCA. The following sections discuss the
contours and limitations of such criminal prosecution and detention in the
terrorism context.
Even where detention under the law of war is available, the criminal
justice system offers some key advantages for the detention and prosecution of
suspected terrorists. We thus aim here to offer a correction to the recent trend
toward favoring law-of-war detention over criminal prosecution and detention.
In the vast majority of cases, criminal prosecution and detention is the most
effective and legitimate way to address the terrorist threat.
We begin this Part by discussing the specific advantages of criminal
prosecution and detention, including predictability, legitimacy, and strategic
("As a former prosecutor, I know firsthand the strength, security and effectiveness of our federal court
system .... Given the reforms since 9/11, the federal court system is even more effective. And, as a
result of lengthy and mandatory minimum prison sentences authorized by Congress and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, those convicted of terrorism-related offenses often face decades, if not life, in
prison.").
231. See, e.g., Jim Comey & Jack Goldsmith, Holder's Decision on Mohammed Trial
Defended, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009
/ 1/19/AR2009111903470.html ("By contrast [to military commissions], there is no question about the
legitimacy of U.S. federal courts to incapacitate terrorists. Many of Holder's critics appear to have
forgotten that the Bush administration used civilian courts to put away dozens of terrorists, including
'shoe bomber' Richard Reid; al-Qaeda agent Jose Padilla; 'American Taliban' John Walker Lindh; the
Lackawanna Six; and Zacarias Moussaoui, who was prosecuted for the same conspiracy for which
Mohammed is likely to be charged. Many of these terrorists are locked in a supermax prison in
Colorado, never to be seen again.").
232. Editorial, Justice for the 'Underwear Bomber,' WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2011, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/justice-for-the-underwear-bomber/2011/10/12/glQAO6dUiLstory.html
("Federal courts have long been a tried-and-true venue in which to prosecute accused terrorists.... The
courts' rules are clear, procedures are fair and their legitimacy is unparalleled. . . . Efforts to strip the
executive branch of this powerful tool or to force all terrorism suspects to be held in military custody
are . . . myopic. . . .").
233. See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75, n.17 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that
under the AUMF, the government cannot detain individuals associated with "terrorist organizations who
merely share an abstract philosophy or even a common purpose with al-Qaeda-there must be an actual
association in the current conflict with al-Qaeda or the Taliban").
234. See, e.g., Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("[Ilt is impossible to
provide an exhaustive list of criteria for determining whether an individual is 'part of' al
Qaeda... . [b]ut the purely independent conduct of a freelancer is not enough."). As discussed below,
this advantage has become much more pronounced in the wake of the D.C. Circuit's 2012 decision that
material support for terrorism may not be tried in the Military Commissions. See infra Subsection
IV.D.I.
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advantages. Next, we respond to critics of criminal prosecution and detention,
considering the three chief concerns that have been raised regarding criminal
prosecution of terrorism suspects in federal court. Finally, we conclude by
acknowledging the limits of criminal prosecution and detention in the terrorism
context.
A. The Advantages of Criminal Prosecution and Detention
The least contested bases for detention authority in any context are post-
conviction criminal detention and pre-verdict detention for those who pose a
risk of flight. It is often assumed that such criminal detention is ill-suited to
terrorists. However, with very little fanfare, federal district court dockets have
been flush with terrorism cases over the past decade. Strikingly, efforts to
measure the conviction rate in these cases place it between 86 and 91
percent. 235 Far from being ineffective, then, trying suspected terrorists in
criminal courts is remarkably effective. It also offers the advantages of
predictability, legitimacy, and strategic benefits in the fight against terrorism.
1. Predictability
Post-conviction detention of terrorists after prosecution in federal court
provides predictability that is currently absent in the military commission
system. Federal district courts have years of experience trying complex cases
and convicting dangerous criminals, including international terrorists, and the
rules are well established and understood. The current military commission
236
system, on the other hand, is a comparatively untested adjudicatory regime.
As already noted, conviction rates in terrorism trials have been close to
ninety percent since 2001, and those rates have remained steady in the face of
large increases in the number of prosecutions. The military commissions, by
contrast, have-as of this writing-convicted seven people since 2001, five of
237 238whom pled guilty. Charges have been dropped against several defendants,
235. See Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001-September 11, 2011, CTR. ON L. AND
SEC., N.Y. UNIV. L. SCH. 4 (2011) [hereinafter Terrorist Trial Report Card] (calculating that 86.9% of
terrorism prosecutions between September 11, 2001 and September 11, 2011 resulted in convictions,
either after trial or after a guilty plea); RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS 29 (2008),
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdflAlumniAffairs/USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf (calculating
that about 91% of charges filed in terrorism prosecutions resulted in a conviction on some charge,
whether after trial or after a guilty plea).
236. See Kris, supra note 229, at 50 ("This invites, if it does not guarantee, challenges to
virtually every aspect of the commission proceedings-the legality of the system, the jurisdiction of the
court, the lawfulness of certain offenses, the rules on the use of evidence derived from coerced
statements, discovery obligations, and the nature of protective orders (among others).").
237. See Military Commissions Cases, MILITARY COMMISSIONS, http://www.mc.mil/cases
/MilitaryCommissions.aspx.
238. See Jane Sutton, U.S. Drops Charges Against 5 Guantanamo Captives, REUTERS, Oct. 21,
2008, http://www.uk.reuters.com/article/2008/10/21/us-guantanamo-hearings-idUSTRE49K65120081021;
James Vicini, U.S. Drops Case To Detain Young Guantanamo Prisoner, REUTERS, July 24, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/24/idUSN24486114.
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and other defendants have been charged but not tried.2 39 The commission
procedures have been challenged at every stage, and it is unclear what final
form they will ultimately take. Even their substantive jurisdiction remains
unsettled. In October 2012, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
overturned Salim Hamdan's military commission conviction for providing
material support to terrorism.240 The Court held that the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, which made material support for terrorism a war crime that could
be prosecuted in the commissions, was not retroactively applicable to
Hamdan's conduct prior to enactment of the statute.241 Moreover, the Court
explained that material support for terrorism was not a recognized war crime
under international law. 2 42 As a result, his conviction for material support for
terrorism in the commission could not stand.243 It is uncertain how this will
affect other trials of detainees, but this decision clearly illustrates the unsettled
nature of the commissions.244
2. Legitimacy
Federal courts are also generally considered more legitimate than military
commissions. The stringent procedural protections reduce the risk of error and
generate trust and legitimacy. 24 5 The federal courts, for example, provide more
robust hearsay protections than the commissions.246 In addition, jurors are
239. See, e.g., News Release, DOD Announces Charges Referred Against Detainee Al Nashiri,
U.S. Dep't of Defense, No. 827-11, Sept. 28, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid
=14821.
240. Hamdan v. United States, No. 11-1257, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 2012).
241. Id. at 27-28.
242. Id. at 24.
243. Id. at 27-28.
244. Interestingly, the commissions have, as of this writing, not meted out lengthy prison
sentences for terrorism suspects. For example, David Hicks was sentenced to nine months in prison.
Michael Melia, Australian Gitmo Detainee Gets 9 Months, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2007, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/31/AR2007033100279.html. Salim Hamdan was
sentenced to 66 months but given credit for 61 months of time served, and made to sign a "pledge not to
commit violent acts." Yemen Releases Former Bin Laden Driver from Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. I1, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/world/middleeast/12yemen.html; see also Kris, supra note 229, at
53 n.147. By contrast, those found guilty of criminal behavior in federal terrorism trials have been
sentenced for significantly longer periods of time. See Kris, supra note 229, at 62. To be sure, it is
difficult to estimate the counterfactual results were the defendants in each case to have been tried in the
other forum. But thus far the commissions have tended to result in shorter sentences. See Kris, supra
note 229, at 64 ("Sentencing in the commissions is much harder to predict at this stage."). In addition,
the Department of Justice was reoriented with respect to counterterrorism prosecution in 2006 with the
creation of the National Security Division, which interfaces with the intelligence community while
coordinating appeals and providing resources to trial prosecutors. USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 506, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (codified in scattered
sections of 18 and 50 U.S.C (2006)); Kris, supra note 229, at 8. This reorganization aims to increase
coordination and experience with terrorism cases and the evidentiary issues they entail.
245. For a summary of the differences between federal criminal procedure and military
commission procedure, see JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40932, COMPARISON OF
RIGHTS IN MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS AND TRIALS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURT (2009).
246. In reformed military commissions, a party may offer a hearsay statement as long as (1) the
evidence is reliable, probative, and lawfully obtained; (2) direct testimony from the witness is not
available as a practical matter, considering the totality of the circumstances; and (3) the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement. Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C.
§ 949a(b)(3)(D) (2006).
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ordinary citizens, not U.S. military personnel. Indeed, some of the weakest
procedural protections in the military commission system have been
successfully challenged as unconstitutional.247 Congress and the Executive
have responded to these legal challenges-and to criticism of the commissions
from around the globe-by significantly strengthening the commissions'
procedural protections. Yet the remaining gaps-along with what many regard
as a tainted history-continue to raise doubts about the fairness and legitimacy
of the commissions. The current commissions, moreover, have been active for
only a short period-too brief a period for doubts to be confirmed or put to
rest.248 Federal criminal procedure, on the other hand, is well-established and
widely regarded as legitimate.
Legitimacy of the trial process is important not only to the individuals
charged but also to the fight against terrorism. As several successful habeas
corpus petitions have demonstrated, insufficient procedural protections create a
real danger of erroneous imprisonment for extended periods.249 Such errors can
generate resentment and distrust of the United States that undermine the
effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts. Indeed, evidence suggests that
populations are more likely to cooperate in policing when they believe they
have been treated fairly.250 The understanding that a more legitimate detention
regime will be a more effective one is reflected in recent statements from the
Department of Defense and the White House. 25 1
3. Strategic Advantages
There is clear evidence that other countries recognize and respond to the
difference in legitimacy between civilian and military courts and that they are,
indeed, more willing to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts when
terrorism suspects are tried in the criminal justice system. Increased
international cooperation is therefore another advantage of criminal
prosecution.
Many key U.S. allies have been unwilling to cooperate in cases involving
law-of-war detention or prosecution but have cooperated in criminal
247. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008).
248. Kris, supra note 229, at 50 ("[Tlhe current commissions are essentially a new creation, and
they do not have the body of established procedures and years of precedent and experience to guide the
parties and the judges.").
249. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 198 (D.D.C. 2008) (granting habeas
relief and ordering release of Lakhdar Boumediene, Mohamed Nechla, Hadj Boudella, Mustafa Ait Idir,
and Saber Lahmar); Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (involving Uighur detainees the
government acknowledged posed no threat to the United States); see also Lakhdar Boumediene, My
Guantanamo Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/opinion
/sunday/my-guantanamo-nightmare.html.
250. See Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Haq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in
Counter-Terrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 296 (2010), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/296-ah-legitimacy.pdf
251. Brennan, supra note 173 (discussing "the perceived legitimacy-and therefore the
effectiveness" of Guantinamo policy); Johnson, supra note 230 (arguing against detention policies that
"make military detention more controversial, not less").
2013] 165
166 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 38: 123
prosecutions. In fact, many U.S. extradition treaties, including those with allies
such as India and Germany, forbid extradition when the defendant will not be
tried in a criminal court. 2 52 This issue has played out in practice several times.
An al-Shabaab operative was extradited from the Netherlands only after
assurances from the United States that he would be prosecuted in criminal
253 254court. Two similar cases arose in 2007. In perhaps the most striking
example, five terrorism suspects-including Abu Hamza al-Masr, who is
accused of providing material support to al-Qaeda by trying to set up a training
camp in Oregon and of organizing support for the Taliban in Afghanistan-
were extradited to the United States by the United Kingdom in October
2012.255 The extradition was made on the express condition that they would be
tried in civilian federal criminal courts rather than in the military
commissions.256 And, indeed, both the European Court of Human Rights and
the British courts allowed the extradition to proceed after assessing the
protections offered by the U.S. federal criminal justice system and finding they
fully met all relevant standards.257 An insistence on using military commissions
may thus hinder extradition and other kinds of international prosecutorial
cooperation, such as the sharing of testimony and evidence.
Finally, the criminal justice system is simply a more agile and versatile
prosecution forum. Federal jurisdiction offers an extensive variety of
antiterrorism statutes that can be marshaled to prosecute terrorist activity
committed outside the United States, and subsequently to detain those who are
convicted.258 This greater variety of offenses-military commissions can only
252. Kris, supra note 229, at 67 (citing Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Republic of India, U.S.-India, June 25, 1997,
T.I.A.S. 12873; Treaty Between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany
Concerning Extradition, U.S.-Ger., art. 13, June 20, 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 9785; Convention on Extradition
Between the United States of America and Sweden, U.S.-Swed., art. V(3), Oct. 24, 1961, 14 U.S.T.
1845).
253. See Robert M. Chesney, United States v. Mahamud Said Omar: An Important New Al-
Shabaab Case in Federal Court, LAWFARE (Aug. 15, 2011, 3:38 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011
/08/united-states-v-mahamud-said-omar-an-important-new-al-shabaab -case-in-federal-court.
254. Kris, supra note 229, at 68 n.190.
255. Basil Katz, Imam Extradited from Britain Pleads Not Guilty to U.S. Charges, REUTERS,
Oct. 9,2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/09/us-usa-security-iman-idUSBRE89816D20121009.
256. Id. ("Under the terms of British and European court rulings authorizing the extradition, the
men must be tried in U.S. civilian courts and federal prosecutors cannot seek the death penalty.").
257. Jill Lawless, UK Court Rules Abu Hamza Can Be Extradited to US, ASSOCIATED PRESS:
BIG STORY (Oct. 5, 2012, 12:30 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/abu-hamza-extradited-us-after-uk
-ruling; Philip Sherwell, Abu Hamza Appears in Court in New York Without His Hook, TELEGRAPH
(London), Oct. 6, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/9591697/Abu
-Hamza-appears-in-court-in -New-York-without-his-hook.html.
258. Federal prosecutors have relied upon numerous substantive statutes to bring terrorism-
related suits for acts committed abroad including: 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006) (providing material support
to terrorists); 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2006) (conspiring to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or damage
property in a foreign country); and 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2006) (acts of terrorism transcending national
boundaries). In cases in which authorities seek extraterritorial jurisdiction, they must first establish that
Congress intended for the statute at issue to be applied outside U.S. territory, either on the basis of
explicit authorization or based on "the nature of the law itself." Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional
Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International
Law, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121, 167 (2007); see also Brian L. Porto, Extraterritorial Criminal
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, I A.L.R. FED. 2d 415 (2005). In order to fulfill the requirements of
international law, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction must also be consistent with one or more of
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punish an increasingly narrow set of traditional offenses against the laws of
war 259--offers prosecutors important flexibility. For instance, it might be very
difficult to prove al-Qaeda membership in an MCA prosecution or a law-of-war
habeas proceeding; but if the defendant has received training at a terrorist camp
or participated in a specific terrorist act, federal prosecutors may convict under
various statutes tailored to more specific criminal behavior.260 In addition,
military commissions can no longer hear prosecutions for material support
committed before 2006.261 Due in part to the established track record of the
federal courts, the federal criminal justice system also allows for more flexible
interactions between prosecutors and defendants. Proffer and plea agreements
are powerful incentives for defendants to cooperate, and often lead to valuable
intelligence-gathering, producing more intelligence over the course of
prosecution. 262
B. Answering Critics of Criminal Law Detention and Prosecution
Those opposed to widespread prosecution and detention of suspected
terrorists under criminal law point to certain constraints on the criminal justice
system, in particular: (1) lack of preventive detention tools, (2) Miranda
limitations, and (3) evidentiary concerns. This section addresses those
limitations and argues that, while some pose genuine obstacles to widespread
criminal prosecution and detention of terrorism suspects, none is
insurmountable in the appropriate cases. Rather, the federal criminal system is
well equipped to confront the complex array of issues that prosecution and
detention of terrorism suspects present.
1. Preventive Detention Concerns and Solutions
The prohibition on detention without charge is fundamental to the
American criminal justice system. This prohibition places limits on the criminal
justice system's ability to incapacitate terrorists and poses a particular dilemma
in cases where individuals the government believes to be truly dangerous
five essential principles of international law: (1) the subjective or objective territorial principle; (2) the
nationality principle; (3) the protective principle; (4) the passive personality principle; and (5) the
universality principle. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402, 404 (1987).
This international law requirement is often satisfied in the terrorism context either by the protective
principle (jurisdiction based on national security concerns) or by the passive personality principle
(jurisdiction based on the victim being American). A further due process limitation on the extraterritorial
reach of criminal statutes is that some nexus must exist between the defendants and the United States, so
that the application of the statute abroad "would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair." United States
v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990). Where a suspect poses a threat to the United States,
including U.S. citizens or missions abroad, this nexus requirement would clearly be satisfied.
259. See supra Subsections II.A.3, IV.D.I.
260. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 229(a) (2006) (assisting the development of a chemical weapon); 18
U.S.C. § 956(a)(1) (2006) (conspiring to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons in a foreign country);18
U.S.C. § 2339D (2006) (receiving military-type training from a foreign terrorist organization); see also
Kris, supra note 229, at 59.
261. Hamdan v. United States, No. 11-1257, 2012 WL 4874564, at 5-6 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 16,
2012).
262. Kris, supra note 229, at 22-24.
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cannot be prosecuted-often because the evidence against them is inadmissible
in court. While indefinite preventive detention is, and should be, outside of the
government's set of counterterrorism tools in the criminal justice system, there
are tools available for legally detaining individuals suspected of terrorism
263offenses. Those tools include material support prosecution, prosecution for
non-terrorism crimes, and administrative detention. We discuss each briefly in
turn.
a. Material Support Prosecution
Targeted prosecution under material support laws may in some cases
provide a useful supplement to direct prosecution of terrorist activities. Where
an individual has not yet engaged in an act of terrorism but has participated in
preparation or other support for an act of terrorism, 2 64 the individual may be
detained and prosecuted under material support laws.265 These laws do not
require prosecutors to prove that the individual has directly engaged in an act of
terrorism. They therefore can be used, and have been used, to prosecute and
detain those suspected of planning or contributing to terrorist acts. 2 66 Material
support prosecutions have been brought, for example, "against individuals who
enrolled in terrorist training camps, who acted as messengers for terrorist
leaders, who intended to act as doctors to terrorist groups, or who raised money
to support terrorist organizations." While excessive use of material support
prosecution against individuals who do not have direct ties to terrorist
organizations is both controversial and problematic, carefully targeted material
support prosecution can be a useful prosecutorial tool.
263. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) ("[The Government's
regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's
liberty interest. For example, in times of war or insurrection, when society's interest is at its peak, the
Government may detain individuals whom the Government believes to be dangerous. Even outside the
exigencies of war, we have found that sufficiently compelling governmental interests can justify
detention of dangerous persons." (citations omitted)). In Salerno, the Supreme Court held that
authorization of pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act constituted permissible regulation that did
not violate substantive due process. Id. at 747-48. In reaching its decision, the Court noted the
"legitimate and compelling" government interest at issue, as well as "Congress' careful delineation of
the circumstances under which detention will be permitted" and the "extensive" procedural safeguards
incorporated in the Act. Id. at 749-52.
264. Prosecutors often charge individuals with inchoate crimes in these situations (e.g., attempt
and conspiracy), but there are certain situations where prosecutors possess insufficient evidence to
sustain an indictment or conviction on these grounds. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario:
Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 28 (2005) ("The
sleeper scenario, however, often will not be amenable to [the strategy of charging individuals with
inchoate crimes]; the essence of the sleeper dilemma is that the suspect cannot be linked to plans to
commit a particular harmful act.").
265. Strategic use of the material support statute to incapacitate individuals supporting terrorist
activities should be distinguished from overbroad use of the material support statute to prosecute
individuals or organizations providing humanitarian aid through designated organizations.
266. Richard B. Zabel & James T. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorist
Cases in the Federal Courts, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST 6 (May 2008), available at http://www.law
.yale.eduldocuments/pdflAlumniAffairs/USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf
168
2013] The Power To Detain 169
b. Non- Terrorism Crimes
Another criminal law detention tool is the use of non-terrorism statutes to
incapacitate terrorism suspects. In a method broadly applied in other areas of
the law, prosecutors can arrest the suspect on an alternative, readily provable
charge that does not, on its face, require any allegation that the defendant is
linked to terrorism. 2 6 7 This "preventive charging" also allows law enforcement
to arrest suspects at an early stage without risking disclosure of sensitive
information.268 Statutes that have been invoked for this purpose include those
criminalizing identity theft, wire fraud, and making misrepresentations to
federal investigators. 26 9 For example, the 9/11 Commission noted in its report
that as many as fifteen of the nineteen September 11 hijackers were vulnerable
to criminal charges based on their fraudulent travel documents. 270
Many of these alternative charges carry high maximum sentences-thirty
27127years for bank fraud, twenty-five for passport fraud,272 and fifteen for
identity theft.273 Cumulatively, these alternative charges can be made either in
addition to or instead of charges of terrorist acts. They present a viable
alternative for incapacitating terrorism suspects who cannot be prosecuted
directly for terrorism. In practice, this approach has worked. Conspiracy
charges led to four life imprisonments and one thirty-three-year sentence in the
2007 Fort Dix plot. 27 4 Perjury, obstruction, and false statement charges added
up to a ten-year sentence in United States v. Sabri Benkahla.275 While some
non-terrorism prosecutions result in shorter sentences, the altemative-long-
term military detention without trial-faces all the problems outlined above.276
267. This strategy is sometimes referred to as the "Al Capone approach," named for the famous
mobster who was prosecuted on tax evasion charges, than on the more obvious racketeering crimes
associated with him. Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy ofPretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 583, 584 (2005); see Harry Litman,
Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEo. L.J. 1135, 1135 (2004).
268. See Chesney, supra note 264, at 30-34.
269. In fact, the Department of Justice has an explicit strategy of employing alternative statutes
for terrorism suspects:
[T]he Department's counterterrorism efforts have broadened since September 11 to include
pursuit of offenses terrorists often commit, such as identity theft and immigration violations.
These statutes include 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (fraudulently obtaining travel documents), 18
U.S.C. § 1425 (immigration violations), and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (making misrepresentations
to federal investigators). Prosecution of terrorism-related targets on these types of charges is
often an effective method-and sometimes the only available method-of deterring and
disrupting potential terrorist planning and support activities without compromising national
security information.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER 29 (2006), available at www.trac.syr.edu
/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf.
270. See NAT'L COMM. ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 384 (2004).
271. 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2) (2006).
272. Id. § 1546 (statutory minimum of twenty-five years in prison applies when done in
furtherance of an act of international terrorism).
273. Id. § 1028(b)(1).
274. United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2011).
275. 530 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008).
276. Consider that many defendants who could only be prosecuted for non-terrorism crimes in
civilian court could probably not be prosecuted for terrorism crimes in a military commission either. The
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c. Administrative Detention
The diverse statutes and regimes authorizing detention for individuals not
convicted of a crime include detention for aliens, sex offenders, the mentally
ill, alcoholics, those with communicable diseases, those awaiting trial, material
witnesses, and others. 2 77 These detentions are generally time-limited and, in
some cases, raise serious due process concerns. They have limited applicability
to suspected terrorists, but in certain dire circumstances may be a relevant tool.
For instance, aliens suspected of terrorism within the United States may in
some cases be legally detained for an immigration violation. Like material
support and non-terrorism crime prosecutions, administrative detention can fill
some of the gaps in the criminal system. Yet like those prosecutions,
administrative detention must also be carefully targeted.
2. Miranda Concerns and Solutions
A second criticism that is often raised in discussions of criminal law
detention for suspected terrorists is the feasibility of providing Miranda
warnings prior to arrest. 2 7 8 This criticism of the criminal law model has
279particular resonance if the suspected terrorist is captured abroad. Critics also
claim that applying Miranda warnings can be an obstacle to gathering
intelligence. 2 80
In practice, providing Miranda warnings has yet to be a real impediment
to intelligence collection in the terrorism context. John Brennan recently
confronted and unequivocally rejected these concerns:
law-of-war alternative in those cases would be multi-year or -decade military detention without charge
or prosecution. The set of cases in which terrorism prosecution is possible in a military commission, but
not in civilian court, is addressed in Section IV.C, infra. It is unclear how large that set of cases actually
is.
277. For a detailed analysis of the different preventative detention regimes, see David Cole, Out
of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 700
(2009), which notes the existing statutory authorities for preventive detention, including pretrial
detention and immigration detention. See also Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in
American Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 85 (2011) (analyzing the pervasive use of non-
criminal preventive detention in different areas).
278. See, e.g., Shawn Boyne, The Future of Liberal Democracies in a Time of Terror: A
Comparison of the Impact on Civil Liberties in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States,
II TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 111, 143 (2003); Brian Haagensen II, Comment, Federal Courts versus
Military Commissions: The Comedy ofNo Comity, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 395, 418 (2006).
279. See Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, U.S. To Prosecute a Somali Suspect in Civilian Court,
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/world/africa/06detain.html (discussing
the case of ed Abdulkadir Warsame, who received a Miranda warning aboard a U.S. naval vessel, but
only after having been interrogated for two months).
280. See Press Release, Chairman Lamar Smith, HR Comm. on the Judiciary, Bill Requires
Consultation Before Giving Terrorists Miranda Rights (Mar. 17, 2011), http://judiciary.house.gov/news
/03172011 MirandaRights.html ("The President's policy of treating terrorists like common criminals has
failed. Giving terrorists the same rights as American citizens ignores the seriousness of the threat from al
Qaeda and other foreign terrorist groups. These are acts of war, not isolated incidents of crime. Foreign
terrorists should be treated like enemy combatants and interrogated by intelligence experts to obtain
crucial information about future attacks. Anything less risks the safety and security of the American
people.").
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Claims that Miranda warnings undermine intelligence collection ignore
decades of experience to the contrary. Yes, some terrorism suspects have
refused to provide information in the criminal justice system, but so have many
individuals held in military custody, from Afghanistan to GuantAnamo, where
Miranda warnings were not given. What is undeniable is that many individuals
in the criminal justice system have provided a great deal of information and
intelligence-even after being given their Miranda warnings. The real danger is
failing to give a Miranda warning in those circumstances where it's
appropriate, which could well determine whether a terrorist is convicted and
spends the rest of his life behind bars, or is set free.
2 81
In fact, it is unclear whether the reading of Miranda rights has any
meaningful effect on the gathering of intelligence or the prosecution of
terrorists. According to one study, approximately eighty three percent of
suspects who were advised of their Miranda rights waived those rights.282 This
empirical finding supports the conclusion reached by FBI Director Robert
Mueller in October 2010: "I do believe that if you look at the number of recent
cases we've had, Miranda has not stood in the way of getting extensive
intelligence." 283
Beyond the dubious operational value of withholding notice of Miranda
rights, the extent to which these warnings in the terrorism context must mirror
those issued in the criminal context remains unsettled. The Supreme Court has
recognized public safety exceptions to Miranda rights284 and lower circuits
have applied this exception within the terrorism context.285 Statements elicited
by foreign law enforcement officials are generally admissible in U.S. courts,
regardless of whether a Miranda warning was given, as long as the statements
were voluntarily made. 286 However, in United States v. Bin Laden, Judge Sand
281. Brennan, supra note 173.
282. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REv. 839, 860 (1996).
283. See Chris Strohm, FBI Says Miranda Readings Don't Hurt Bureau, Congress Daily,
NAT'L J. DAILY, Oct. 9, 2010, www.nationaljoumal.com/congressdaily/nsp_201
0 10 0 6 _7 148.php.
284. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (finding defendant's pre-Miranda
custodial statement to police officers admissible when asked about the location of a gun in a
supermarket because of the imminent threat to public safety posed by the weapon).
285. United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2000) (invoking Quarles to permit
the government to introduce incriminating statements made prior to the administration of Miranda
warnings in a case involving an impending terrorist attack on the New York City subway system); see
also ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 10 ("As an initial matter, few individuals have been placed
on trial following a battlefield capture; the vast majority of confessions in terrorism cases have resulted
from traditional interrogation by law enforcement officers rather than soldiers . . .. [W]e believe in a
battlefield situation, the courts would likely find that Miranda does not apply."); Kris, supra note 229, at
77 ("Where the exigency in question is the danger of bombs on commercial aircraft or other coordinated
mass-casualty attacks-as opposed to a loose gun in a supermarket-the public-safety exception should
permit broader questioning, as necessary, to protect against the threat."). The courts will address this
issue in the course of the trial of Ahmed Warsame, the Somali terror suspect held for two months aboard
a Navy ship before being Mirandized and indicted in the Southern District of New York. Ken Dilanian,
Somali Terror Suspect Secretly Held on Navy Ship for Two Months, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/201 1/jul/05/nationfla-naw-somali-detainee-20110706.
286. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2003); see also United States. v.
Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 373-74 (E.D. Va. 2005) (holding that inculpatory statements made by an
American citizen to Saudi Arabian officials without Miranda warnings were admissible because they
were not the product of a "joint venture" relationship between U.S. and Saudi officials, nor were they
produced by means that shock the judicial conscience).
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of the Southern District of New York held that Miranda does generally apply
when U.S. law enforcement questions a detainee outside the United States.287
This does not mean that the government cannot detain and interrogate an
individual held abroad; it simply means that law enforcement must read the
detainee his Miranda rights in order to use any of his statements in a criminal
court.288 For the foregoing reasons, providing notice of Miranda rights is not
likely to be a substantial hindrance in the detention and prosecution of
suspected terrorists.
3. Evidentiary Concerns and Solutions
Opponents of federal criminal law prosecution and detention of suspected
terrorists often point to two evidentiary concerns: (1) the inability to utilize
sensitive national security information for fear of exposure, and (2) adherence
to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which makes it impossible for the
government to present probative evidence in terrorism cases. 28 9 Once again,
these challenges can be met within the criminal justice system.
a. Release of Sensitive National Security Information
Critics of terrorism prosecution in criminal court worry that exposure of
probative evidence in a trial will imperil ongoing investigations or sources.
However, the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) offers a decisive
answer to this concern. It allows sensitive national security information to be
used in a federal criminal trial without being publicly released.290 Under
CIPA's detailed procedural framework, classified evidence need not be
disclosed to the defense during discovery unless the court finds, based on an in
camera review, that it is relevant under traditional evidentiary standards, and
even relevant evidence may be withheld through a non-disclosure order (for
which the government may face some sanctions). All of the relevant
proceedings are conducted without the defendant present and in secure facilities
287. 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 187-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
288. For a review of Miranda's application to suspected terrorists, see William J. Stuntz, Local
Policing Afier the Terror, Ill YALE L.J. 2137, 2186-90 (2002). Some have suggested an even more
expansive Miranda public safety exception. See Jeffrey S. Becker, A Legal War on Terrorism:
Extending New York v. Quarles and the Departure from Enemy Combatant Designations, 53 DEPAUL L.
REv. 831, 864-69 (2003); see also M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in
an Age of Terrorism, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 319 (2003) (examining the problem of false
confessions and proposing approaches to serve the needs of law enforcement).
289. See Andrew C. McCarthy & Alykhan Velshi, Outsourcing American Law: We Need a
National Security Court, American Enterprise Institute (July 16, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.aei.org/paper/100038.
290. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2006); see also ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 85
("Thus, while CIPA has provided a flexible, practical mechanism for problems posed by classified
evidence, Congress did not intend the statute to ossify the courts' ability to deal with these issues.
Rather, Congress' express intent in enacting CIPA was that federal district judges, and thus the criminal
justice system, 'must be relied on to fashion creative and fair solutions to these problems,' i.e., the
problems raised by the use of classified information in trials." (quoting United States v. Rosen, 2007
WL 3243919, at *7 (E.D. Va. Nov. 1, 2007))).
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to ensure maximum protection for classified information. Moreover, classified
evidence that is released may use substitutions to minimize security risks. 291
CIPA has been used in many terrorism cases where the government seeks
to rely on evidence that is probative of the defendant's guilt but that implicates
sensitive national security interests. In particular, it has been used to protect
information concerning intelligence sources, means of intelligence gathering,
and even the state of our intelligence on other subjects or intelligence
priorities.292 CIPA allows defendants the opportunity to examine the
government's classified evidence where a judge deems it necessary. 29 3 A report
by former federal prosecutors who surveyed CIPA invocations in criminal court
concluded that "courts have proved, again and again, that they are up to the task
of balancing the defendant's right to a fair trial, the government's desire to
offer relevant evidence, and the imperative of protecting national security." 294
While CIPA has become a fixture in criminal law terrorism prosecutions,
courts have also had to balance security concerns and due process in assessing
the government's duty to disclose "evidence favorable to an accused" under the
Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland.2 9 5 This has been particularly
challenging when some of the government's evidence is confidential or when
the government's "witnesses are either being detained by the government or are
involved in ongoing counterterrorism efforts."296 The Court in United States v.
Moussaoui dealt with precisely these challenges as defense counsel sought
Brady material in the form of access to certain detained al-Qaeda figures.297
The Fourth Circuit rejected the lower court's proposed solution-a closed
video deposition of the witnesses-arguing that while Moussaoui was entitled
to the witnesses' exculpatory information, summaries of interviews or
291. For a more in-depth discussion of CIPA procedures, see LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT (CIPA): AN OVERVIEW (1989); and Zabel &
Benjamin, supra note 235, at 82-91.
292. See, e.g., Aref v. United States, 452 F.3d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing trial court's
issuance of a protective order in criminal terrorism trial pursuant to CIPA).
293. Timothy Shea, Note, CIPA Under Siege: The Use and Abuse of Classified Information in
Criminal Trials, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 657, 662 (1990).
294. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 8; see also Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
N.Y., THE INDEFINITE DETENTION OF "ENEMY COMBATANTS": BALANCING DUE PROCESS AND
NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 143 (2004) (There is "no indication that
[CIPA], reasonably interpreted by federal judges, is inadequate to the task of protecting national security
interests while affording defendants a fair trial."). But see Afsheen John Radsan, Remodeling the
Classified Information Protection Act, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 441-42 (2010) ("[Zabel and
Benjamin's] study examined only minor cases of material support to terrorism. The Bush administration,
in part to avoid problems under CIPA, turned away from the federal courts and dealt with high-level
cases through alternative means. Second, in a significant error, the two authors failed to interview
intelligence officers to learn the true costs of public trials to sources and methods. Accordingly, their
study does not address what is necessary to surmount the obstacles that compelled the Bush
administration to move away from civilian courts after 9/11. For the two former prosecutors, CIPA is a
wand to wave at all problems of mixing classified information with public trials.").
295. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the
government's Brady obligation extends to evidence that may be used to impeach government witnesses.
See 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) ("[W]hen the 'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of
guilt or innocence,' non-disclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [the Brady doctrine.]"
(quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959))).
296. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 93.
297. 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004).
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interrogations of these witnesses would satisfy the government's Brady
obligation.298 While this was not squarely a CIPA issue, the court used the
CIPA balancing scheme to craft a suitable alternative to the depositions. 299The
government was required to produce summaries that were as unedited and true
to the original statements of the witnesses as possible without compromising
national security. 30 0 Summary evidence would be a sufficient substitution for
deposition testimony so long as "the compiling of substitutions [is] an
interactive process among the parties and the district court" and the
substitutions are crafted so that they "use the exact language .. . to the greatest
extent possible." 301
The compromises reached under both CIPA and Brady to protect
classified information are made significantly more challenging where a
defendant chooses to proceed pro se. In Faretta v. California, the Supreme
Court recognized a constitutional right to self-representation in criminal
cases.302 However, in a subsequent case, McKaskle v. Wiggins, the Court
acknowledged that this right is not absolute. 303 The McKaskle Court held that
court appointment of standby counsel, who can assist the defendant with
courtroom procedures and mechanics, is fully consistent with a defendant's
right to self-representation. During terrorism related trials, just as in
international criminal trials,304 standby counsel can play a crucial role in acting
as a buffer between the government and the defendant to protect information
305that the court agrees must remain confidential. This issue arose in United
States v. Moussaoui when the defendant sought to represent himself pro se. The
lower court allowed Moussaoui to represent himself with standby counsel in
order to, among other things, review classified national security documents.
When Moussaoui challenged his exclusion from reviewing the classified
information, the court ruled that "Moussaoui's Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights are adequately protected by standby counsel's review of the classified
discovery and their participation in any proceedings held pursuant to
[CIPA] ... even though the defendant will be excluded from these
298. Id. at 456-57.
299. Id. at 471.
300. Id. at 480.
301. Id.
302. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
303. 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
304. There have also been a number of pro se litigants in international prosecutions. In these
cases, some judges have attempted to accommodate the scope of the right to self-representation while
others have disallowed defendants from proceeding pro se when doing so would not serve the interests
of justice. In a number of cases, judges have allowed litigants to proceed pro se, but have required
standby counsel to assist the defendant. See GIDEON BOAS, THE MILOSEVIt TRIAL: LESSONs FOR THE
CONDUCT OF COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 205-17 (2007).
305. 465 U.S. at 183. ("Faretta rights are also not infringed when standby counsel assists the
pro se defendant in overcoming routine procedural or evidentiary obstacles to the completion of some
specific task .. .. Nor are they infringed when counsel merely helps to ensure the defendant's
compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure."); see also ZABEL & BENJAMIN,
supra note 235, at 89 ("[W]e anticipate that courts would recognize that a criminal defendant cannot
plausibly claim an entitlement to see classified information by the simple expedient of firing his lawyer
and that, in this area, standby counsel can be relied upon to protect the defendant's interests.").
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proceedings."306 The use of standby counsel for CIPA purposes demonstrates
judicial ingenuity and flexibility in balancing security and due process
concerns. While the pro se scenario certainly poses a challenge to prosecuting
these cases in federal court, the Moussaoui case makes clear that this challenge
is not insurmountable.307
b. Admissibility ofEvidence
The second evidentiary concern raised in opposition to criminal
prosecution and detention of suspected terrorists is that the Federal Rules of
Evidence make it difficult or impossible for the government to present
probative evidence in terrorism cases. This concern can be further broken down
into three separate issues: (1) authentication requirements; (2) testimony from
witnesses around the world, including some who may be active in the military;
and (3) the hearsay rule.308
Regarding the first concern, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide a
relatively low burden for proving the authenticity of evidence, requiring only
that "'sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find
in favor of authenticity or identification."' 309 The admission of evidence is a
decision of the trial judge310 and judges in the past have exercised this
discretion flexibly in international terrorism cases. 311 In practice, the
authentication rules have not appeared to impose a significant barrier to the
-312
prosecution of terrorism cases.
The second concern involves the unavailability of witnesses, particularly
for the trial of individuals seized abroad. According to federal prosecutors who
have surveyed past terrorism prosecutions, "alleged problems with unavailable
witnesses are not supported based on our review of the cases that have been
brought." 313 Moreover, courts have been flexible in this regard-allowing
depositions and other forms of testimony in the terrorism context, despite
Confrontation Clause concerns raised by some parties.314
306. United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2002 WL 1987964 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23,
2002) (denying Moussaoui's motion to gain access to classified information).
307. For further discussion on balancing the defendant's right to self-representation with
safeguarding the government's interest in protecting confidential information, see Joshua L. Dratel,
Ethical Issues in Defending A Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and Security Impair the Defense of a
Terrorism Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 81, 100 (2004).
308. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 107. For an in-depth discussion of how these
issues are confronted in the terrorism criminal law trials, see id. at 107-10.
309. United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1303 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting 5 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1901(a), at 901-17 (1990)).
310. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (admissibility of evidence is a decision for the court).
311. See, e.g., United States v. al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 162 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing how
the prosecution relied on a "Mujahidin Form" to demonstrate the defendant's predisposition to support
terrorist activities and to rebut the impression created by the defense that there were no documents or
other evidence establishing al-Moayad's involvement in supporting terrorism early on in the alleged
conspiracy).
312. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 107.
313. Id. at 108.
314. See, e.g., United States v. Ressam, Order, No. CR 99-666C-001, 2005 WL 6582294 (W.D.
Wash. Sept. 1, 2000) (granting the government's motion, over the defendant's Confrontation Clause
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Finally, there has been opposition to federal criminal trials due to the
inflexibility of hearsay rules. This may be a more serious impediment in some
cases, but it generally is not insuperable. Hearsay rules are necessary to protect
the right of defendants to receive a fair trial. Federal evidence rules contain
numerous exceptions that provide judges with the necessary flexibility to admit
out-of-court statements in criminal cases as appropriate. 3 15 Moreover, in the
past, courts have shown flexibility regarding hearsay rules in the terrorism
context.316 These cases demonstrate that courts are able, when necessary, to
take national security concerns into account in making hearsay
determinations.3 17
In sum, none of the common objections to criminal prosecution and
detention of suspected terrorists presents an insuperable barrier. There are more
preventive detention options through the criminal justice system than many
realize, and Miranda and evidentiary-based concerns about use of the criminal
system in terrorism cases have been overstated. Although it may not be
possible to apply criminal jurisdiction to detain suspected terrorists in every
case, the criminal system remains an underappreciated alternative to law-of-war
detention.
V. CONCLUSION
As the United States enters the second decade following the attacks of
September 11, 2001, it is time to re-examine the legal basis for ongoing
counterterrorism efforts. The Obama Administration has eschewed references
to the "war on terror" trumpeted by its predecessor "-and rightly so. The
number of al-Qaeda members active in Afghanistan, where the September 11
attacks were planned and orchestrated, now number in the hundreds at most.3 19
At the same time, threatening terrorist groups across a broad geographic
objection, to allow depositions of Canadian witnesses who were outside the court's subpoena power and
who were unable or unwilling to testify at trial in the United States).
315. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801, 804(b)(3).
316. See, e.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 112 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding the trial
court's admission into evidence of materials seized from defendant that considered "the desirability of
attacking enemies of Islam" and "how to produce and use explosives"); United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F.
Supp. 2d 338, 373 (E.D. Va. 2005) (concluding that inculpatory statements made to Saudi Arabian
interrogators while defendant was detained were voluntary and admissible); see also ZABEL &
BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 107 ("[Hearsay] issues have traditionally been addressed in a common-
sense manner, and our research indicates that to date they have not presented a significant obstacle to the
government's terrorism prosecutions.").
317. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 10 ("The Federal Rules of Evidence.. . generally
provide a common-sense, flexible framework to guide the decision whether evidence is admissible in
court. We are not aware of any terrorism case in which an important piece of evidence has been
excluded on authentication or other grounds.").
318. Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, 'Global War on Terror'Is Given New Name, WASH. POST, Mar.
25, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html.
319. Paul Cruickshank, Brennan on Bin Laden Raid, and "Dangerous" Yemen, CNN:
SECURITY CLEARANCE (Apr. 20, 2012, 4:34 PM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/04/20/brennan-on
-bin-laden-raid-and-dangerous-yemen ("[Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism John Brennan] estimated there were still several hundred al Qaeda members in the
FATA, and another hundred in Afghanistan."); "Afghan Number Two" Abdul Ghani Killed-NA TO,
BBC NEWS, Apr. 26, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13193634 ("Nato estimates
some 100 al-Qaeda members still operate in Afghanistan.").
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scope-some loosely affiliated with al-Qaeda and some not-have proliferated.
The U.S. Department of State currently lists fifty-one separate foreign terrorist
organizations. 320
In this context, treating counterterrorism efforts-and justifying
counterterrorism detention-primarily through the lens of war is no longer
practical or effective. Nor does existing law provide sufficient legal authority
for detaining a wide range of terrorist suspects under the law of war. As this
Article has shown, statutory authority for detention under the 2001 AUMF,
2002 AUMF, and MCA, and the President's independent constitutional
authority under Article II, are narrowly circumscribed and subject to significant
limitations.
It is time, then, for a new approach to counterterrorism detention-one
that recognizes the advantages that the criminal law system offers not simply
for defendants but for counterterrorism efforts as well. Already the criminal
justice system has proven to be highly effective at detaining and prosecuting
terrorists, and it has provided a level of predictability, legitimacy, and
flexibility that is missing in prosecution and detention practice carried out
within the frame of war. The well-established procedural protections within the
criminal justice system promise to reduce the risk of error and thus ensure that
the results are regarded as more legitimate than those in the military
commission process. A fairer and more flexible detention regime will make a
more effective contribution to counterterrorism operations.
There will likely remain some cases in which law-of-war detention is the
best available alternative for detaining terrorism suspects. Yet instead of
treating law-of-war detention as the centerpiece of the United States'
counterterrorism detention program, the government should treat criminal law
detention as its first resort, and should consider law-of-war detention only for
those cases in which the detention is unambiguously authorized under both
domestic law and international law, and the detainee poses a continuing,
substantial threat.
Moving toward a regime of detaining and prosecuting terrorism suspects
primarily through the criminal law would reveal terrorists for what they really
are-criminals guilty of violating the law rather than soldiers in a war. It would
also allow the United States to live up to the "better angels of our nature" by
providing even those we suspect of plotting against us the full benefit of the
principled commitments that make the United States different from those who
have attacked it. That may, in the end, prove to be the most important weapon
of all.
320. Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Sept.
28, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/ris/other/des/123085.htm.
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